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Chapter 1
Introduction
Messire Loup vous servira,
s’il vous plaıˆt de robe de chambre.
Le Roi gouˆte cet avis-la`:
On e´corche, on taille, on de´membre
Messire Loup. Le Monarque en soupa
Et de sa peau s’enveloppa.
Sir Wolf, here, won’t refuse to give
His hide to cure you, as I live.
The king was pleased with this advice.
Flayed, jointed, served up in a trice,
Sir Wolf first wrapped the Monarch up,
Then furnished him whereon to sup.
Jean de La Fontaine, Le Lion, le Loup, et le Renard, Livre VIII, fable 3
In literature, foxes are traditionally depicted as shrewd and wily creatures, that trick and
deceive those around them. In La Fontaine’s The Crow and the Fox, the Fox profusely compli-
ments the Crow’s voice, and steals the cheese that the credulous bird held in his beak, before
he answered the praise and broke into singing. Foxes are also cunning and selfish, and behave
very rationally in a way. In The Wolf, the Fox and the Horse, the Horse, wary of the two other
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animals, enjoins them to read his name off his back hooves. Circumspect, the Fox pretends to
be illiterate and has the Wolf approach the Horse - and his kick - in his stead.
Foxes are not figures of power however, they obtain what they want and escape punishment
not through strength or authority, but influence. They convince rather than command. Though
they do not rule, they can sway their masters’ decisions and bend their will to serve their own.
In The Lion, the Wolf and the Fox, an old Lion calls on his court to bring him a cure for his old
age. The Fox cautiously stays home, aware of the impossibility of the task at hand. Seeking
the King’s favors, the Wolf goes by his bedside and denounces the Fox’s absence. Abruptly
summoned, the Fox recognises the Wolf’s enmity and starts appealing to the Lion. He was on
a pilgrimage for the Lion’s health he pleads, whereupon he learnt of a prescription to cure his
ailment: flay a wolf and wear his warm skin. Heeding the advice, the Wolf is flayed and served
for supper, as the Lion wraps himself in his fur.
This dissertation is also about foxes, lions and wolves. However, here they will be called
decision-makers, agents, information providers, corporations, advocates, party leaders, lobby-
ists, interest groups or congressmen. Though they are not short fables, the following chapters
each tell a different story about influence and its consequences, using economic theory and
methods to discern who is the Fox or the Wolf, and who gets to keep his skin.
The second and third chapters of this book are theoretical and study, in different settings, how
agents with private verifiable information can persuade a decision-maker. The fourth chapter is
an empirical exercise, which shows that party leaders in the US House of Representatives have
used federal funds in order to maintain voting discipline among Representatives.
Chapter 2, co-authored with Otto Swank, uses theory to analyze a practical case: pharma-
ceutical companies that want to bring a new drug to the market have to convince public agencies
that the drug is effective and safe. How- ever, there is evidence that new drugs are sometimes
3approved on the basis of incomplete information. This chapter develops a simple persuasion
game in which a pharmaceutical company communicates with a health agency on two aspects of
a drug: effectiveness and side effects. We show that there exists an equilibrium in which a health
agency may approve a drug even though the pharmaceutical company is known to conceal some
information. The out- comes of this equilibrium appear to be consistent with empirical obser-
vations. We also discuss how an equilibrium with full information revelation requires the health
agency to take a sceptical attitude towards all uncertain aspects of a drug.
Chapter 3 attempts to explain how organizations make decisions when they are faced with
different levels of uncertainty. In this chapter, I model a persuasion game with three players: a
decision-maker and two information providers. As in the previous chapter, the decision-maker
is uninformed about the consequences of her decision, and relies on the information provided
by interested parties. In this one however, I assume that the different aspects of the decision
are heterogenous, so that the decision-maker faces an asymmetric uncertainty. The information
providers act as advocates1 and communicate on distinct aspects of the decision. I show that
the asymmetric uncertainty introduces a distortionary bias in the equilibrium decision, but that
more uncertainty validates this bias and alleviates its distortionary effects. I then compare the
advocacy setting with two competing information providers to one where only one partisan
information provider collects and sends information on all aspects of the decision. I find that
welfare is higher under the advocacy system when the asymmetry is high, and reach a somwehat
counterintuitive conclusion: competition among information providers that communicate on
heterogenous aspects of the decision is more desirable if the asymmetry between them is high
enough.
Chapter 4 is empirical and studies a somewhat more elementary tool of influence than strate-
gic communication: quid pro quo, in the US House of Representatives. For many observers
1cf. Dewatripont and Tirole (1999)
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in the US, earmarks - federal funds designated for local projects of US politicians - epitomize
wasteful spending and corrupt politics. Others argue earmarks are critical for the legislative pro-
cess because they facilitate agreements among representatives. Despite a lack of evidence sup-
porting either side, there has been a moratorium on earmarking since 2011. Ironically, the end
of earmarks provides a means to assess their effects on the legislative process. In this chapter, I
exploit the introduction of the moratorium to examine the effects of earmarks on congressional
voting, campaign con- tributions and spending, and electoral outcomes. I show that legislative
support for the party line is tremendously sensitive to the availability of earmarks, even though
earmarks represent less than a tenth of one percent of the federal budget. After ear- marks were
discontinued, Representatives were much less likely to vote alongside the party leadership. I
also show that, without earmarks, Representatives performed worse in ensuing elections, spent
more on campaigning, and collected more money from special interests. The findings imply
that because earmarks made re-election more likely, party leaders could use them to facilitate
agreements on legislation. They also suggest that the discontinuation of earmarks gave special
interests more influence over politicians. I conclude that earmarks are, in fact, better for the
legislative process.
Chapter 2
Pieces of Truth, Pharmaceutical
Companies and New Drugs
Joint work with Otto Swank
2.1 Introduction
Many countries have a health agency to control and review drugs that are brought to the market1.
The usual procedure is that a pharmaceutical company that has developed a new drug submits
an application for a marketing authorization to the responsible health agency. This application
should contain evidence that the new drug is effective and safe. It is the responsibility of the
company to provide this evidence. On the basis of the information supplied, the health agency
then decides whether to approve the drug or not.
Since the preferences of the health agency and the pharmaceutical company are not fully
aligned, we may expect that pharmaceutical companies have incentives to distort information.
In a health care setting, distorting information usually means withholding information rather
than forging information. The reason is that health agencies have expertise in assessing the
1For example, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the United States and the European Medicines
Agency (EMA) in the European Union.
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scientific evidence that is presented to them (such as clinical trial results, chemical tests and so
on.). Information is hard in the sense that it can be verified (see Dewatripont and Tirole (1999)
and Beniers and Swank (2004) on the distinction between soft and hard information). Still,
pharmaceutical companies can conceal information.
Milgrom and Roberts (1986) show that in a setting where a decision maker has to rely on an
interested party for information and when this information is verifiable, the interested party of-
ten has incentives to reveal its information. All that is needed is that the decision maker adopt a
sceptical posture. Scepticism means that if the informed party does not reveal information, then
the decision maker assumes the worst. This attitude gives interested parties strong incentives
to supply information. Unfortunately, Milgrom and Roberts’ prediction about the revelation of
information does not always come true in a health setting. On the contrary, it sometimes fails
with very adverse consequences. Illustrative is the approval of Rofecoxib, an anti-inflammatory
drug developed and produced by the pharmaceutical company Merck. The drug was approved
by the FDA, the US health agency, in 1999, and withdrawn by Merck in 2004 over concerns that
it raised the risk of cardiovascular problems. By the time Merck had taken the drug out of the
market, around 80 million people had been prescribed the medicine (Topol, 2004). Ensuing liti-
gations showed that Merck had withheld information about the risks associated with Rofecoxib
from the health authorities and the medical community (Psaty and Kronmal, 2008).
Merck is not the only pharmaceutical company that has withheld information from health
agencies. Turner et al. (2008) collected data on trials for antidepressants approved for marketing
between 1987 and 2004. From the 38 studies that found positive results for these drug products,
37 were published. From the 36 studies that found negative results, only 3 were published.
Drawing from many examples, Goldacre (2012) also argues that the pharmaceutical industry
generally fails to publish all the results from clinical trials. Moreover, having a vested interest
seems to matter. Bekelman et al. (2003) show that studies that are financed by pharmaceutical
companies find pro-industry evidence 3.6 times more often than studies that are not.
The main objective of this chapter is to offer an explanation for why health agencies some-
times approve drugs on the basis of incomplete information. To this end, we analyze a per-
suasion game a` la Milgrom and Roberts (1986) where the decision maker - a health agency -
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faces a decision with two uncertain aspects. In this setting, a pharmaceutical company has the
option to provide information about one aspect of the drug, say its effectiveness, while conceal-
ing information about the other aspect. We show that even though the health agency may know
that the pharmaceutical company has concealed some information, it is under certain conditions
an optimal response to approve the new drug. The implication is that optimal approval deci-
sions cannot be guaranteed if the pharmaceutical company is able to make a case for its product.
Health agencies should adopt, whenever possible, a sceptical attitude towards all relevant aspects
of new drugs.
This chapter is closely related to Milgrom and Roberts (1986). We extend their model by
adding another dimension of uncertainty. Sharif and Swank (2012) apply the model of Milgrom
and Roberts to a lobbying setting. Much of the literature on informational lobbying uses a
cheap-talk model in the spirit of Crawford and Sobel (1982). An excellent overview of this
literature is Grossman and Helpmann (2001). Notably, Battaglini (2000) examines the effects of
multidimensionality in a cheap-talk model. As discussed above, in our model communication
is not cheap. Information can be verified. Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) analyzes a model
where two parties with opposing preferences provide verifiable information about two stochastic
terms. In our model, there are also two stochastic terms, but there is only one interest group, the
pharmaceutical company.
2.2 The Model
Consider a pharmaceutical company (PC) that has to make a case for a new drug it has devel-
oped. A health agency (HA) makes a decision X ∈ {0, 1}, either granting the drug approval,
X = 1, or rejecting it, X = 0. The drug has two relevant aspects, µ and ε. µ is a measure
of the healing capacity of the drug for instance, and ε is a measure of its side effects. The PC
knows the values of µ and ε. The HA only knows that µ and ε are uniformly distributed over the
interval [−h, h]2.
2Our results also hold with more general distributional assumptions. We choose the uniform distribution to keep
computations simple.
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Approval of the drug yields a payoff, UHA (X), to the HA equal to
UHA (1) = p+ µ+ ε with p < 0 (2.1)
By normalization, rejection yields a payoff equal to 0, UHA (0) = 0. In (2.1), p is the predisposi-
tion of the HA towards approval. The assumption that p < 0 means that without any additional
information, the HA rejects the drug. Approval of the drug yields a payoff, UPC (X), to the PC
equal to
UPC (1) = q + µ+ ε with p < q < 0 (2.2)
Again by normalization we assume that UPC (0) = 0. q is the predisposition of the PC towards
approval3. As p < q, there exist ranges of µ and ε for which the PC wants the HA to approve
the drug, though it is not in the interest of the HA to approve. Finally, we assume that −2h < p.
This assumption implies that for some values of µ and ε, the HA prefers approval to rejection.
Clearly, this assumption ensures that the decision on the drug is an interesting one.
The HA relies on information provided by the PC. More specifically, we assume that the PC
sends a message,m, about the stochastic terms: m ∈ {{µ, ε} , {µ} , {ε} ,∅}. m = {µ, ε}means
that the PC reveals all its information. m = µ (ε) means that the PC reveals partial information,
µ (ε). Finally, m = ∅ means that the PC does not provide any information. Following Milgrom
and Roberts (1986) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), we assume that information is hard. The
PC can withhold information, but it cannot forge it. After the HA has received m, it updates its
beliefs about µ and ε, and makes a decision on X .
The timing of the game is:
1. Nature draws µ and ε. It reveals µ and ε to the PC, but not to the HA.
2. The PC sends a message to the HA.
3. The HA updates its beliefs about µ and ε, and makes a decision on X .
4. Payoffs are realized.
3We assume that p and q are negative for simplicity purposes. The analysis when p or q is higher than 0 is
similar, but with more cases.
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In the next section, we discuss three perfect Bayesian equilibria of our game. In these equi-
libria, the decision onX maximizes the expected payoff of the HA, givenm and its beliefs about
µ and ε. Moreover, anticipating the strategy of the HA and given beliefs, m maximizes the ex-
pected payoff of the PC. Lastly, whenever possible, beliefs are updated according to Bayes’
rule.
In the first equilibrium, the PC does not manipulate information. As a result, the decision
on X is in line with the interests of the HA. In the second equilibrium, the PC either sends a
message about µ and ε, or does not send any information. Sending m = ∅ leads to approval
of the drug. Finally, in the third equilibrium, the PC manipulates information by sending partial
information, m = µ. The strategies of the players in this third equilibrium are consistent with
the observations about pharmaceutical companies and health agencies made in the introduction.
There exist other perfect Bayesian equilibria than the three we look at. An obvious one is
the equilibrium in which the PC manipulates through ε instead of µ. We focus on three that are
most relevant to our case. The equilibria we discuss are equilibria in straightforward threshold
strategies.
2.3 Equilibria
We start with discussing an equilibrium in which the outcome of the game is always in line with
the interest of the HA. We refer to this equilibrium as the informative equilibrium.
Proposition 2.1. An equilibrium of the lobbying game exists in which the PC sends m = ∅ if
p + µ + ε < 0, and m = {µ, ε} if p + µ + ε ≥ 0. The HA chooses X = 1 if and only if
m = {µ, ε}. Out of equilibrium beliefs are: E (µ+ ε|µ) < −p and E (µ+ ε|ε) < −p.4
A straightforward interpretation of the informative equilibrium is that the HA demands ev-
idence on all aspects of a drug before approving it. This forces the PC to supply information
about both µ and ε. As a result, the PC cannot manipulate the decision of the HA. The weakness
of the informative equilibrium lies in the out of equilibrium beliefs. What does the HA believe
4Two variants of the informative equilibrium exist. To induce X = 0, the PC can send m = µ or m = ε instead
of m = ∅.
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if the PC presents highly favorable information about µ, but no information about ε? Milgrom
and Roberts (1986) point out that for an informative equilibrium to exist, a HA with a sceptical
posture suffices. Then, m = ∅, m = µ and m = ε mean that the PC has something to hide
and the HA will reject the drug. The sceptical posture is sustainable in equilibrium because the
HA can perfectly identify when the PC is hiding information. In our model, the HA knows that
the PC is fully informed, and it also knows exactly what kind of information the PC holds. This
allows the HA to ”punish” the PC by rejecting the drug when the PC hides information. How-
ever, if there were any uncertainty about either the PC being informed, or about the existence
of one of the stochastic terms, then the sceptical posture might become suboptimal for the HA.
It might lead the HA to reject a the drug when it should approve it. Existence of this informa-
tive equilibrium could become problematic5. So a health agency needs to be able to ascertain
precisely how much pharmaceutical companies know for the sceptical posture to be effective in
every situation. In our model, we have implicitly assumed that the HA possesses the powers and
resources to do so. If it were not the case, the HA might not be able to induce full revelation of
information by the PC.
The next proposition presents an equilibrium of the game in which the outcome is always
in line with the preferences of the PC. We refer to this equilibrium as the equilibrium with full
manipulation.
Proposition 2.2. Suppose E (µ+ ε|µ+  ≥ −q) > −p. Then, an equilibrium of the lobbying
game exists in which the PC sends m = ∅ if q + µ + ε ≥ 0, and m = {µ, ε} if q + µ + ε < 0.
The HA chooses X = 1 if and only if m = ∅. Out of equilibrium beliefs are: E (µ+ ε|µ) < −p
and E (µ+ ε|ε) < −p.6
The equilibrium with full manipulation almost mirrors the informative equilibrium. Equi-
librium messages have opposite meanings. From an analytical point of view the informative
equilibrium and the equilibrium with full manipulation are very similar. Their existence de-
pends on the same out of equilibrium conditions. In the context of our lobbying application,
5see the appendix for more details.
6
Also two variants of the equilibrium with full manipulation exist. To induce X = 0, the PC can send m = µ or
m = ε instead of m = {µ, ε}.
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the equilibrium with full manipulation is less plausible. Procedures require that the PC makes a
case for a new drug. This suggests that approval requires that at least some evidence has to be
presented. What about the posture of the HA? The HA’s posture is positive in case no evidence
has been presented, and sceptical in case partial evidence has been presented. In our setting,
a positive posture means that the HA would approve the new drug, even though information
has been withheld. This positive posture is the reason why the PC can manipulate the HA. The
equilibrium with full manipulation suggests that from a social point of view, the HA should not
place too much trust in the PC, and that it should not give latitude to withhold information.
In the third equilibrium, the PC tries to influence the HA by sometimes supplying partial
information. We refer to this equilibrium as the equilibrium with partial information provision.
Proposition 2.3. Let µˆ = −2p + q − h. An equilibrium of the lobbying game exists in which
the PC sends m = ∅ if q + µ + ε < 0, m = µ if q + µ + ε ≥ 0 and µ ≥ µˆ, and m = {µ, ε}
otherwise. The HA chooses X = 0 ifm = ∅, or ifm = {µ, ε} and p+µ+ε < 0, and it chooses
X = 1 when m = µ. Out of equilibrium beliefs are: E (µ+ ε|ε) < −p.7
In the equilibrium with partial information provision, the PC induces the HA to approve the
drug by revealing µ, if µ is sufficiently high. The PC only reverts to fully revealing information
with m = {µ, ε} if µ is low. In this case, the HA will choose X = 1 only if µ + ε > −p.
So, in case µ is sufficiently high, the outcome of the game is in line with the preferences of the
PC. For small values of µ, the outcome of the game is in line with the preferences of the HA.
This stands in contrast with the equilibrium presented in Proposition 2.2, where the PC always
induces approval of the drug when it sends m = ∅. The strategies of both the PC and the HA
presented in Proposition 2.3 are more consistent with the evidence discussed in the introduction.
7One variant of the equilibrium with partial information provision is one where the PC sends m = {µ, ε} also
if p+ µ+ ε < 0.
In practice, the effectiveness of a new drug often captures more attention than its other aspects. It is naturally
the main requirement for the drug to be approved. In Proposition 2.3 the PC induces approval by advertising the
potency of its new drug (µ) while withholding information about its side effects (ε), thus releasing effective but
potentially harmful drugs in the market.
There exist other equilibria with partial information provision. An obvious one is the symmetric equilibrium, in
which the PC sends m = ε instead of m = µ if q + µ + ε ≥ 0 and ε ≥ µˆ. There also exists an equilibrium in
which the PC induces approval by revealing µ or ε, depending on which is higher. The analysis is similar to that in
proposition 2.3, and can be found in the appendix.
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In the appendix we also show that this equilibrium exists for a wider range of parameters than
the equilibrium with full manipulation8.
Note that in the equilibrium with partial information provision the posture of the HA is pos-
itive when the PC reveals µ, but the HA is sceptical when the PC reveals ε. Another interesting
feature is that by revealing µ, the PC also provides information about ε. The reason is that by
revealing µ, the PC signals that it wants the HA to approve the drug. Consequently, fromm = µ,
the HA infers that ε > −q − µ.
Pharmaceutical companies sometimes provide enough evidence to have drugs approved but
at the same time conceal relevant information. Proposition 2.3 shows that even when the HA
knows that the PC conceals information it may approve a drug. Of course, this requires that
the information supplied is positive. The extent to which the PC can manipulate with providing
partial information depends on its predisposition towards X = 1. The higher is q, the higher is
µˆ, so the lower is the probability that with µ only the PC can induce the HA to choose X = 1.
Suppose that µ < µˆ, ε > µˆ and µ+ ε > −q. Can the PC induce the HA to approve the drug
by sending m = ε? From m = ε, the HA likely infers that −q − ε < µ < µˆ = −2p + q − h.
Then, E (µ|m = ε) = −p − 1
2
h − 1
2
ε. It is an optimal response of the HA to choose X = 1 if
p+ ε+
(−p− 1
2
h− 1
2
ε
)
> 0, implying ε > h, which cannot hold by assumption. Hence, if the
HA does not succeed to manipulate the HA by providing information about µ, providing instead
information about ε does not help. Of course, an equilibrium with partial information provision
does exist in which the PC sends m = ε instead of m = µ if q + µ+ ε ≥ 0 and ε ≥ µˆ.
2.4 Conclusion
Pharmaceutical companies have to convince health agencies of the effectiveness and safety of
the drugs they want to sell. Health agencies are responsible for protecting the public health
by controling and reviewing new drugs before they are brought to the market. In this chapter
we have shown that it is optimal from a public health perspective to take a sceptical attitude
towards evidence presented by pharmaceutical companies. We have also shown that letting
8see the appendix for the proof.
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pharmaceutical companies make a case for their drugs may lead to suboptimal outcomes, and
we have argued that this case fitted empirical observations well.
Trial registries have been considered a potential solution to the agency problem with new
drugs. Pharmaceutical companies have been encouraged to register all clinical trials they con-
ducted, so that more information be accessible. However, most attempts to implement these
registries have failed (Goldacre, 2012). Following the discussion of our results, giving pharma-
ceutical more trust and latitude is likely to induce them to conceal relevant information. In a
public health environment, the public, the medical community and corporate interests can focus
attention on the effectiveness of a drug, or divert attention from other aspects. Health agencies
must withstand such pressure so that drug approval decisions not be compromised.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Computation of the threshold µˆ in proposition 2.3.
Assume the PC sends m = µ to the HA. From this message, the HA infers that q + µ + ε > 0,
thus:
E (µ+ ε|m = µ) = µ+ E (ε|ε > −q − µ)
=
−q + µ+ h
2
The HA will then approve the drug if p+ −q+µ+h
2
> 0⇔ µ > −2p+ q − h.
In order for the equilibrium in proposition 2.3 to exist, we need to assume that µˆ < h ⇔
q
2
− p < h, otherwise a partial message would never be feasible: the threshold would be too
high. We discuss existence of equilibria in footnote 9, which is detailed in this appendix further
below.
2.A.2 Footnote 5: the informative equilibrium becomes more fragile when
we add uncertainty.
Let us add the following assumption to our model: at the beginning of the game, the PC knows
the values of µ and ε with probability γ, and with probability 1−γ it only knows the value of µ.
There is now uncertainty about whether the PC is fully informed or not. This added uncertainty
reduce the range of parameter values for which the informative equilibrium exists.
Assume that the PC behaves informatively, and consider the HA’s beliefs when it receives
m = µ.
If the HA believes that the PC only has information about µ and that it is truthfully revealing,
then we have, from the HA’s perspective:
E (ε|m = µ) = 0
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And the HA will approve the drug if p + µ > 0. Clearly, this gives the PC incentives to
deviate when it knows µ and ε, and when −q < µ+ ε < −p and p+ µ > 0.
So the HA cannot trust the PC to behave informatively.
Now assume that the HA is sceptical (as in proposition 2.1), so that it always rejects the drug
when it receives m = µ. In proposition 2.1, it induces the PC to behave informatively and leads
to optimal approval decisions. Here however, this may lead to suboptimal decisions, depending
on parameter values.
Assume that p > −h, then there exist some values of µ such that p+µ > 0. If the PC is only
partially informed and it is revealing its information about µ when p + µ > 0, the HA should
approve the drug. Thus, the sceptical posture is unsustainable when p > −h.
Thus, the informative equilibrium would not exist when we add uncertainty and p > −h.
If p < −h, then the sceptical posture is still possible and the informative equilibrium still
exists.
We presented a simple case here, but we obtain the same result when we add uncertainty
about the stochastic terms, or about the PC’s information.
2.A.3 Footnote 7: another equilibrium with partial information provision
There exists another form of equilibrium with partial information provision. In this equilibrium,
the PC may induce the HA to approve the drug by revealing µ or ε, depending on which one is
higher.
Let µ˜ = q
2
− p. In this equilibrium, the PC sends m = ∅ if q + µ + ε < 0; m = µ if
q + µ + ε ≥ 0, µ > ε, and µ ≥ µ˜; m = ε if q + µ + ε ≥ 0, µ > ε, and ε ≥ µ˜; and m = {µ, ε}
otherwise. The HA chooses X = 0 if m = ∅, or if m = {µ, ε} and p + µ + ε < 0, and it
chooses X = 1 when it receives m = µ or m = ε.
µ˜ is derived as follows: assume that q + µ + ε ≥ 0, µ > ε, and that the PC sends m = µ.
From this message, the HA infers that ε ∈ [−q − µ, µ], so we have, from the HA’s perspective:
E (ε|m = µ) = −q
2
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so that the HA will approve the drug if p+ µ− q
2
> 0⇔ µ > q
2
− p. The analysis is similar
if ε > µ and the PC sends m = ε.
In order for this equilibrium to exist, we also need that µ˜ < h ⇔ q
2
− p < h, which is the
same condition than for the equilibrium presented in the text.
The interpretation of this equilibrium is relatively similar to the one presented in the text.
Here, the PC may send information about either of the two stochastic terms. It will choose
to communicate information about the better aspect of the drug, given that the information is
positive enough (higher than µ˜). In the equilibrium in proposition 2.3, the PC may only send
information about one aspect. The notable difference here is that the PC can choose which
aspect it wants to advertise by the HA, however the HA will also infer that the advertised aspect
is the better one. If for instance the PC sends m = µ, then the HA anticipates that q+µ+ε ≥ 0,
and that ε < µ. In order to convince the HA, µ will have to be higher than in the equilibrium in
proposition 2.3: we have µ˜ > µˆ⇔ q
2
− p < h.
2.A.4 Footnote 8: the equilibrium with partial information provision ex-
ists for a wider range of parameters than the equilibrium with full
manipulation.
The equilibrium with full manipulation exists if E (µ+ ε|µ+  ≥ −q) > −p. The equilibrium
with partial information provision exists if there exists some µ > µˆwith µ+E (ε|ε > −q − µ) >
−p.
So, if there exists some µ > µˆ, such that µ + E (ε|ε > −q − µ) > E (µ+ ε|µ+  ≥ −q),
it means that the equilibrium with partial information provision exists for lower values of p. We
show that there always exists at least one such value.
Assume µ = h.
Then µ+ E (ε|ε > −q − µ) = h− q
2
And we have E (µ+ ε|µ+  ≥ −q) = 2
3
h− 2
3
q
h− q
2
> 2
3
h− 2
3
q ⇔ 2h > −q
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which always holds.

Chapter 3
Asymmetric Persuasion
3.1 Introduction
Many decisions are made on the basis of information supplied by different parties. A buyer
looking for a second-hand car may heed the advice of a salesman at a local car dealership, but
also consider offers from online sellers. A judge will consider the arguments of all parties to a
litigation before ruling over the case. Important decisions in central banks and corporations are
often made in committees. In those instances, the individual or the organization making a deci-
sion has to consider different pieces of information received from various sources. For instance,
the car seller may have very detailed information about the car engine, its fuel consumption, the
tyres, the availability of spare parts, while online ads may only feature the brand of the car and
its mileage. A prosecutor arguing its case before the judge may be more skilled at presenting
evidence than the defense attorney. Different committee members do not necessarily have the
same level of expertise on all subjects pertaining to monetary policy or corporate strategy. Fur-
thermore, if the interests of the informed parties are not aligned with hers, the decision-maker
not only has to consider the heterogenous nature of the information provided, but she also has
to take into account that the informed parties may communicate strategically.
This chapter attempts to explain how individuals and organizations make decisions when
they are faced with different levels of uncertainty. Consider a company that needs to decide how
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to allocate funds between two divisions, one with a risky project, the other with a safe one. At the
board meeting, the division heads come with performance reports, business plans and forecasts
to make their case in order to obtain the larger share of the budget. While the board’s objective is
to make the best possible decision for the company, the division heads may not share this agenda,
and rather seek to obtain the best possible decision for their own division. They will then have
incentives to communicate strategically. The difference in uncertainty between the two projects
also matters: if the risky project turned out to be very successful, the division head might present
overwhelming evidence that his project is superior. On the other hand, if the division head did
not report on the project, the board could suspect that he is hiding a consequential failure, worse
than any outcome of the safer project. In this chapter, I try to shed some light on the effects of
such asymmetric uncertainty.
I model a persuasion game with three agents: an uninformed decision-maker, and two in-
formation providers. The decision maker must make a binary decision with uncertain conse-
quences. Her payoffs depend on her decision and on the realizations of two random variables.
The asymmetry in uncertainty is introduced with the assumption that the two variables are drawn
from uniform distributions, but that one has a larger support, so that it may take more extreme
values. Following Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), the two information providers act as advo-
cates. Advocates have opposite preferences, and it is assumed that their payoffs are purely
decision-based, so that the final decision can only be either in their favor, or against them.
Furthermore, the advocates collect information and communicate on distinct aspects of the de-
cision: they receive information and can send a message about only one of the two random
variables. This advocay framework departs from the classic form of competition between in-
formation providers, where the agents communicate on the same aspects of the decision, and
assumes instead that they communicate on separate issues. This form of organization is rel-
atively widespread1, and it readily applies to the company setting described above, where the
division heads would not be responsible, or maybe even allowed, to report on activities outside
of their own division. In line with the literature on persuasion, I assume that the agents can only
send verifiable information. Forging information or lying is not possible, or prohibitively costly,
so an informed agent can only reveal his information or hide it.
1Many examples can be found in Dewatripont and Tirole (1999).
3.1 Introduction 21
The main objective of this chapter is to examine how the asymmetry in uncertainty affects
the agents’ communication strategies and the final decision. Competition among information
providers is generally expected to increase the amount of information revealed in equilibrium,
and yield more informed decisions (Milgrom and Robert (1986)). However, competition among
advocates who communicate on heterogenous aspects of the decision are less clear. I first show
that the asymmetry introduces a distortion: it biases the decision against the agent that can send
more extreme messages. In equilibrium, both agents play a threshold strategy, i.e. they only
reveal information that is likely to shift the decision in their favor and hide their information
otherwise. The agent who can send more extreme messages is then also expected to hide rela-
tively more adverse outcomes, and gets penalized by the decision maker when he does not reveal
information. The second result shows that a larger degree of asymmetry increases the quality
of the final decision and welfare. As the asymmetry increases, it becomes more likely that the
agent that can send more extreme messages is actually hiding very adverse outcomes when he
does not communicate, and the decision maker is more often right when she decides against
him. In other words, more asymmetry validates the bias that it introduces in the final decision.
Finally, I put the model in perspective by comparing it to one where there is only one partisan
information provider collecting information and communicating on both aspects of the decision.
I find that, when the asymmetry is low and when the agents are less likely to be informed ex
ante, it is then more desirable to have a single agent trying to manipulate the decision maker
rather than two competing advocates. When the asymmetry is high, or when the agents are very
likely to be informed ex ante, the quality of the decision and welfare are higher with advocates.
I reach a somewhat counterintuitive conclusion: that competition among informed parties
works better when there is more asymmetry among them. An important limitation of the model
though is that it does not endogenize information collection, so that I do not examine the effects
of asymmetric uncertainty on the incentives to search or produce information. This point and
the relevance of the model are discussed further in the conclusion.
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3.2 Related literature
This study contributes to the literature on persuasion, where interested parties try to convince
an uninformed decision maker with verifiable information. A survey of the main findings from
these models can be found in Milgrom (2008), and in Valsecchi (2013) who also gives a broader
overview of the literature on strategic communication. With regards to previous studies on
persuasion, the aim of this chapter is to provide new insights about the effects of competition
between information providers. In Milgrom and Roberts (1986) for instance, competition among
informed parties that have opposed interests leads to fully informed decisions. However full
revelation disappears when there is uncertainty with regards to whether the informed parties are
informed or not. More specifically, I draw directly upon Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) and
their model of advocacy. In their paper, advocates collect verifiable information on only one of
two stochastic variables. The authors show that competition among advocates generally leads
to more informed decisions than a single nonpartisan information provider. They also show that
when information can be concealed, the benefits of advocacy increase in the probability that the
agents are informed ex ante. I extend this analysis, with a slightly more general model, where
the decision maker faces an asymmetric uncertainty, represented by two different continuous
stochastic variables. The main contribution of this chapter is then to show that the asymmetry
induces a distortionary bias in the decision when there are two advocates, and that a single
information provider can sometimes generate more welfare than advocates.
Persuasion models have also been used in a strand of literature on judicial decisions that
compares the adversarial and the inquisitorial systems of litigation. In the adversarial system,
an arbitrator or a judge makes a decision on the basis of evidence provided by opposing parties
(for instance the plaintiff and the defendant, or the prosecutor and the defense attorney). In
contrast, in the inquisitorial system, evidence is provided by a single nonpartisan agent. As
in Shin (1998) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), the adversarial system is generally thought
to be superior because competition among agents with opposed preferences generates more
information disclosure than when there is only a nonpartisan agent. The findings presented in
this study suggest a more nuanced argument: I show that, in the presence of asymmetry, the
adversarial system may be even less efficient than a single biased agent, but that it remains
3.2 Related literature 23
more efficient if the asymmetry is large enough or if the advocates have a high chance of being
informed ex ante.
Furthermore, this chapter adds on to previous studies on competition between informed ex-
perts, where the information setting or the players are heterogenous. Shin (1994) presents a
model relatively close to the one in this chapter, where an arbitrator receives verifiable messages
from a plaintiff and a defendant and decides on the amount of compensation the latter will have
to pay. Both parties have an incentive to hide unfavorable information, but if one party is more
likely to be informed about the true state of the world, the arbitrator will expect him to hide
adverse information more often, and will be less likely to rule in his favor. I reach a different
result with a similar reasoning. In the model developed below, the agents collect information
and report on different issues, and it is the agent with the ’noisiest’ messages who eventually
gets penalized, because the decision maker expects him to hide more extreme values of his sig-
nal. Relatedly, Sharif and Swank (2012) present a model of informational lobbying with two
interest groups that have different costs of information collection. They show that the interest
group with the lower cost will get penalized when it does not communicate, but that the level of
heterogeneity between the two interest groups does not affect the decision ex ante. In a similar
way in this chapter, the amount of heterogeneity between the two aspects of the decision does
not affect the decision ex ante, but it does induce a fixed constant bias against the player that can
send more powerful messages. With regards to heterogeneity in the information setting, Beniers
and Swank (2004) develop a model where committee members can search for either soft or hard
information and show that advocacy - two agents with opposite preferences collecting hard in-
formation - yields more informed decisions when the cost collecting information is high. I do
not take information collection into account, and my conclusions differ slightly, as I show that
the benefits of advocacy increase when the information parties have a higher chance of being
informed ex ante.
Finally, this study is related to the accounting literature on financial disclosure (see Beyer
et al. (2010) for an extensive survey). The results suggests that, in a competitive environment,
risky managers will communicate less often. This is rather consistent with the empirical findings
in Li’s (2010), who implements a lexical analysis of annual reports, and shows that reports of
firms that have lower earnings are more difficult to read, and that firms with reports that are
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easier to read exhibit more persistent profits.
3.3 Model
I examine a persuasion game with three agents. Suppose a decision maker (DM) has to make
a binary decision X ∈ {a, b} with uncertain consequences η and φ. The optimal decision for
the DM depends on the realizations of these two random variables. η and φ are independent.
The DM can either implement project a (X = a) and receive payoffs UDM (X = a) = η + φ,
implement project b (X = b), with payoffs UDM (X = b) = − (η + φ). Thus, if the DM knew
the values of η and φ, the optimal decision is to choose X = a if η + φ is positive, X = b if
negative, and randomize between the two options when η + φ = 0. Without loss of generality,
we assume that the DM randomizes with probability 1
2
2.
UDM (X) =
 η + φ if X = a− (η + φ) if X = b (3.1)
An important feature of the model is that there is some asymmetry with regards to the two
dimensions of the decision. η and φ have the same weight in the DM’s payoffs, but I assume that
η is drawn from a distribution with a wider support, so that it may take more extreme values:
η ∼ U [−β, β], and φ ∼ U [β − 1, 1− β], with β ∈ (1
2
, 1
)
. I normalize η + φ ∈ [−1, 1], so
that the analysis focuses on the relative effects of asymmetry, i.e. the effects of the difference
between the two distributions, not the effects of the total amount of uncertainty.
The DM is uninformed about the realizations of η and φ, but she can receive information
from two informed parties A and B. Another important feature of the model is that A and B
are never fully informed about the consequences of the project, but rather specialize in one
dimension each. A may only have information on η, and B may only have information on φ.
At the beginning of the game, A receives a signal sA ∈ {η, ∅}, B receives sB ∈ {φ, ∅}. This
2This assumption bears no significance for the analysis: any other randomization is also possible.
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signal is informative, i.e. si 6= ∅ for i ∈ {A,B}, with prior probability ρ = Pr (sA = η)
= Pr (sB = φ), ρ ∈ (0, 1).
Both parties can only send verifiable information, so that they cannot pretend to be informed
if they are not, and they cannot forge the value of their signal. If their signal is informative, A
sends a message mA ∈ {η, ∅} to the DM, and B sends mB ∈ {φ, ∅}. When informed, both
parties can either disclose the value of their signal, or hide it by sending an empty message. If
they do not receive an informative signal, A and B can only send an empty message mi =
∅, i ∈ {A,B}. I assume that communication is free. I also assume that when A or B is
indifferent between revealing the value of his signal and hiding it, they will choose to hide it
and send an empty message: when they have no strict incentives to communicate, A and B
will not say anything. Arguably, this assumption is relatively natural and serves as a proxy
for communication costs: when they expect no gain either way, A and B would rather not
communicate. Furthermore, without this assumption, there would exist infinitely many mixed-
strategy equilibria, that are qualitatively similar. With it, I restrict the set of possible equilibria
to a unique one where A and B play pure strategies (which also exists when the assumption is
relaxed). I then focus the analysis on a relatively simpler and more natural equilibrium, without
any real loss of generality.
Both parties have one-sided and opposite preferences over the DM’s decision. Moreover,
A and B’s payoffs are purely decision-based: A receives a fixed reward RA (X) = R > 0 if
X = a, and 0 otherwise. Conversely, B receives payoffs RB (X) = R if X = b and 0 otherwise.
RA (X) =
 R if X = a0 if X = b and RB (X) =
 R if X = b0 if X = a (3.2)
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. A and B receive their respective signals sA and sB.
2. A and B send their respective message mA and mB to the DM.
3. The DM updates her beliefs about η and φ and makes a decision on X .
4. Payoffs are realized.
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The way aymmetry is introduced in the model is relatively flexible3. It expresses the idea that
A and B communicate on heterogenous aspects of the decision. However, the asymmetry could
also represent a difference in abilities between A and B: A could be more skilled at collecting
information, or A could communicate ’louder’ or more noisily than B. It could also be argued
that the DM cares more about η than φ. Given that the DM is risk-neutral, it actually does not
matter whether the asymmetry concerns the distributions of η and φ, or the DM’s preferences
over the two dimensions4. What eventually matters is the relative uncertainty between the two
dimensions: in the main model, the uncertainty associated with η can have a larger impact on
the DM’s decision.
Following the example in the introduction, the DM would represent a board of directors and
A and B two division heads. Nevertheless, the model can be applied to a variety of situations:
in the context of a legal decision, the judge (DM) might be presented with different pieces
evidence (η and φ) from the opposing parties (A and B). These pieces of evidence may not
have the same relevance to the case at hand: η could be direct evidence while φ would be
circumstancial evidence. Both η and φ influence the judge’s choice, but if there is strong direct
evidence (i.e. extreme values of η) it is enough to sway the final decision. The asymmetry can
also be interpreted as a difference in abilities or resources between the two parties (A may be
more skillful at presenting evidence, or better at collecting it), or even as a bias from the judge in
favor of A. The model can also be applied to a organizational setting: employees that have been
assigned heterogeneous tasks (A in charge of η, B in charge of φ) may compete for a reward by
providing performance reports to the manager (DM). For the analysis of the model, I will use
generic terms to refer to the game and the players.
In what follows, I look at Perfect Bayesian equilibria. This requires that A and B’s communi-
cation strategies mA (sA) and mB (sB) are optimal given the DM’s decision rule X (mA,mB),
3Asymmetry in the model is represented by one distribution being a scaling of the other. A linear transform
would also be possible but it would not add to the analysis. Uniform distributions were chosen for computational
simplicity, but other self-replicating distributions could also be possible.
4We could assume that η and φ are drawn from the same distribution U [−1, 1], but that the DM cares relatively
more about the value of φ, such that:
UDM (X) =
{
βη + (1− β)φ if X = a
− (βη + (1− β)φ) if X = b
with β ∈ ( 12 , 1). The analysis of both model variants is entirely similar.
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and that the DM’s decision rule is optimal given her beliefs about A and B’s communication
strategies. Beliefs are updated using Bayes’ rule. Most proofs can be found in the appendix.
3.4 Analysis
I first examine A and B’s communication strategies. Then I establish the equilibrium of the
game and the first results.
3.4.1 Preliminaries: threshold strategies
When informed, A and B have one alternative: either reveal or hide the value of their signal.
In equilibrium, the DM will update her beliefs about the values of η and φ, after receiving mA
and mB. Her optimal behavior is then to choose X = a if E (η|mA) + E (φ|mB) > 05, X = b
if E (η|mA) + E (φ|mB) < 0 and it is assumed that she randomizes between the two choices
with probability 1
2
if E (η|mA) + E (φ|mB) = 0. Given that A and B cannot lie about the value
of their signals, then A will have an incentive to reveal only high values of η, and B only low
values of φ, in order to shift the DM’s decision in their favor.
Formally, this implies that for A and B, given the DM’s decision rule, and given the other
player’s communication strategy, a threshold strategy is a best response. For instance, assume
that A is informed and receives sA = {η}. A anticipates the DM’s decision rule as described
above and that E (η|mA = ∅) +E (φ|mB = ∅) < 0 so that the DM chooses X = b when she re-
ceives two empty messages. For any strategy that B plays, i.e. for any P ⊂ {[β − 1, 1− β] , ∅},
such that, when informed, B reveals φ if φ ∈ P , and hides if φ /∈ P , A’s expected payoffs are
then6:
5η and φ are independent, so that for the DM E (η + φ|mA,mB) = E (η|mA) + E (φ|mB).
6The expected value E (φ|mB = ∅) is from the DM’s perspective.
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E (RA (X)) =

(1− ρ)R + ρPr (φ /∈ P )R + ρPr (η + φ > 0|φ ∈ P )R
if η > −E (φ|mB = ∅) and A reveals
(1− ρ) 1
2
R + ρPr (φ /∈ P ) 1
2
R + ρPr (η + φ > 0|φ ∈ P )R
if η = −E (φ|mB = ∅) and A reveals
ρPr (φ ∈ P |η + φ > 0)R
if η < −E (φ|mB = ∅) and A reveals
(1− ρ)R + ρPr (φ /∈ P )R + ρPr (φ+ E (η|mA = ∅) > 0|φ ∈ P )R
if A hides
(3.3)
A’s expected payoffs when revealing are increasing in the value of η. Moreover, if η is very
low, then it is optimal for A to hide his signal. Thus, for any strategy that B may play, A’s best
response is a threshold strategy: when informed, A reveals η if η is larger than a threshold η¯,
and hides his signal otherwise. The optimal value of η¯ depends on A’ anticipation of the DM’s
decision rule and B’s strategy. The same analysis applies to the situation where E (η|mA = ∅)+
E (φ|mB = ∅) < 0 and the DM chooses X = b when she receives two empty messages. This
applies similarly to B: for any strategy that A may play, B’s best response when informed will
be to reveal φ if φ is lower than a threshold φ¯, and hide otherwise.
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, A and B’s strategies can only be threshold strategies.
Furthermore, the strategies ’always reveal when informed’ and ’always hide’ can be consid-
ered as threshold strategies where the threshold is equal to one of the bounds of the distribution.
However they cannot be equilibrium strategies. For A for instance, always revealing cannot be
optimal for very low values of η. Always hiding is also not tenable in equilibrium: the DM
would have expectations E (η|∅) = 0, which would give A incentives to deviate when η > 0. A
similar reasoning holds for B. These strategies can then be ignored, when I solve for equilibrium.
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3.4.2 Equilibrium
I now solve the model: the DM’s optimal behavior is straightforward: choose X = a if
E (η|mA) + E (φ|mB) > 0, X = b if E (η|mA) + E (φ|mB) < 0, and either option with
probability 1
2
if E (η|mA) +E (φ|mB) = 0. As was shown above, when A and B anticipate this
decision rule, their best response is to play a threshold strategy: when informed, A will reveal
η if η > η¯, η¯ ∈ [−β, β]; and when informed, B will reveal φ if φ < φ¯, φ¯ ∈ [β − 1, 1− β]. In
equilibrium, A and B choose their optimal thresholds η¯ and φ¯ given the DM’s decision rule, and
given that the other information provider plays an optimal threshold strategy.
The DM correctly anticipates the threshold strategies in equilibrium and updates her beliefs
about η and φ accordingly. For instance, if the DM receives mA = {η}, then she knows the true
value of η; if she receives mA = ∅, then she knows that either A is uninformed, or A is informed
and η ≤ η¯, and she updates her beliefs as follows:
E (η|mA = ∅) =
Pr (sA = ∅|mA = ∅)E (η|sA = ∅)
+ Pr (sA ≤ η|mA = ∅)E (η|η ≤ η¯)
(3.4)
= ρ
η¯2 − β2
4β − 2βρ+ 2η¯ρ
Similarly, when B sends mB = ∅:
E (φ|mB = ∅) =
Pr (sB = ∅|mB = ∅)E (φ|sB = ∅)
+ Pr
(
sB ≥ φ¯|mB = ∅
)
E
(
φ|φ ≥ φ¯) (3.5)
= ρ
φ¯2 − (1− β)2
2 (1− β) ρ− 4 (1− β) + 2φ¯ρ
In order to describe the equilibrium mechanisms, let us consider A’s decision. A anticipates
the DM’s decision rule and expects B to play an optimal threshold strategy. Thus, in equilibrium
A knows the values of E (η|mA = ∅) and E (φ|mB = ∅), and what the DM will choose when
she receives two empty messages. Furthermore, A knows the ex ante probability that B is
informed and for which values of φ B will reveal his signal or send an empty message. If A is
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uninformed, he can only send an empty message. If A is informed, his expected payoffs from
revealing η are increasing in η (cf. (3.3)). Whether η is greater, lower or equal to E (φ|mB = ∅)
also matters since there is always a positive probability that B sends an empty message (if B
is uninformed, or if φ ≥ φ¯). A’s expected payoffs from hiding depend on how often B reveals
values of φ that are lower than E (η|mA = ∅), and on what the DM chooses when she receives
two empty messages. The optimal threshold η¯ is then the value of η for which his expected
payoffs from revealing η and his expected payoffs from hiding are equal. B’s optimal threshold
φ¯ is determined in a similar manner.
We can now establish the unique equilibrium of the game. Uniqueness is ensured by the
assumption that A and B send an empty message when they are indifferent between hiding and
revealing their information.
Equilibrium. There exists a unique equilibrium where:
• the DM choosesX = a ifE (η|mA)+E (φ|mB) > 0,X = b ifE (η|mA)+E (φ|mB) < 0,
and randomizes between the two with probability 1
2
if E (η|mA) + E (φ|mB) = 0. In
equilibrium the DM then chooses:
– X = a when {mA,mB} = {η, ∅}, or {mA,mB} = {η, φ} and η + φ > 0.
– X = b when {mA,mB} = {∅, φ}, or {mA,mB} = {η, φ} and η + φ < 0,
or when {mA,mB} = {∅, ∅}.
• A and B both play a threshold strategy: when informed, A reveals if η > −E (φ|mB = ∅)
and hides otherwise; when informed, B reveals if φ < E (φ|mB = ∅) and hides otherwise.
•
E (φ|mB = ∅) = 1
ρ
(β − 1)
(
ρ+ 2
√
−ρ+ 1− 2
)
(3.6)
When the DM receives two informative messages, i.e. {mA,mB} = {η, φ}, then she can
always make an informed decision. When she receives only one informative message, i.e.
{mA,mB} ∈ {{η, ∅} , {∅, φ}}, she always decides in favor of the player who sent the infor-
mative message. The salient feature of this equilibrium however, is that the DM always choose
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X = b when she receives two empty messages: E (η|∅) + E (φ|∅) < 0 always holds in equi-
librium. There does not exist an equilibrium where, in this situation, she chooses X = a or
randomizes between the two options. Uniqueness of the equilibrium is ensured by the assump-
tion that A and B remain silent when they are indifferent between revealing and hiding their
signal, but relaxing that assumption does not allow for equilibria where the DM follows a dif-
ferent decision rule than in the equilibrium above.
The fact that the DM will favor B when both information providers remain silent is a direct
consequence of asymmetry. A receives a signal drawn from a distribution with a wider support,
so A’s message may contain more extreme values, that can even make B’s message irrelevant
(when η > 1 − β). But given that A plays a threshold strategy, it also implies that the DM will
expect A to hide more extreme values when he sends an empty message. In equilibrium then,
the DM will always chooseX = bwhen A sends an empty message. Whether B reveals or sends
an empty message, X = b is always the best decision: B reveals if φ < E (φ|mB = ∅) and hides
otherwise, and E (η|mA = ∅) + E (φ|mB = ∅) < 0.
In equilibrium then, A always receives null payoffs when he sends an empty message, which
affects his communication strategy. A never has a strict incentive to hide his signal. But he
also has no incentive to communicate if η ≤ −E (φ|mB = ∅), in which case he will send an
empty message. Only when η > −E (φ|mB = ∅) does A have an incentive to reveal his signal.
In contrast, B has an incentive to send an empty message when φ ≥ E (φ|mB = ∅), since
there is always a positive probability that A will send an empty message (either because he is
uninformed, or because η ≤ −E (φ|mB = ∅)), which would then induce the DM to choose
X = a.
When we compare A and B’s communication in equilibrium, we also see that, ex ante, B
will reveal his signal more often than A:
Pr (η > −E (φ|mB = ∅)) < Pr (φ < E (φ|mB = ∅)) (3.7)
Both distributions are symmetric around 0, only the support for η is wider, which implies
that Pr (η > −E (φ|mB = ∅)) < Pr (φ > E (φ|mB = ∅)). Furthermore, E (φ|mB = ∅) is de-
creasing in β (cf. (3.6)) , Pr (η > −E (φ|mB = ∅)) is also decreasing in β.Thus, the asymmetry
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not only harms A’prospects when he sends an empty message, it also makes his communication
relatively less effective than B’s and induces him to stay silent relatively more often.
Based on the players’ behavior in equilibrium, we can compute the ex ante probabilities that
the DM will choose X = a or X = b, which yields the first proposition.
Proposition 3.1. Asymmetric uncertainty induces a fixed constant bias against the information
provider that can send more extreme messages. In equilibrium, the ex ante probability that the
DM chooses X = a is Pr (X = a) = 1
2
ρ, while Pr (X = b) = 1 − 1
2
ρ, and the asymmetry
parameter β does not affect the ex ante decision.
This result may seem counterintuitive: asymmetry was introduced by assuming that one
dimension of the decision, η, may matter more than the other. Yet A, who collects and provides
information about η is actually penalized in equilibrium: ex ante the DM is always more likely
to choose X = b. Instead of favoring A, the asymmetry biases the decision against him. This
bias in the DM’s ex ante decision is caused by the threshold strategies. The fact that η may take
larger values than φ can be an advantage when A actually reveals his signal, but it also means
that A can hide larger values when he sends an empty message. An empty message from A
carries more uncertainty relatively to one from B, which the DM accounts for, leading him to
always choose X = b then.
This bias in the ex ante decision is also fixed and constant in the sense that it is not af-
fected by the degree of asymmetry β. No matter how large or small β is, the DM already
accounts for the asymmetry when she forms her expectations ex ante. It is not the extent of
asymmetry but only its presence that shapes the DM’s choice, with regards to the situations
where A will be informed or not. In the latter case, A will always send an empty message,
which induces the DM to choose X = b. This property of the DM’s ex ante decision can also
reformulated as follows: conditional on A being informed, the ex ante decision is fully neutral:
Pr (X = a|sA 6= ∅) = 12 ; and conditional on A being uninformed, the ex ante decision is fully
biased towards B: Pr (X = a|sA = ∅) = 0.
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3.4.3 Advocacy and asymmetry
In the previous section, I derived the unique equilibrium of the game and showed that the asym-
metry between η and φ had a significant impact on the DM’s decision rule in equilibrium. Now
we turn to the effect of asymmetry on the quality of the DM’s decision. In this section, I in-
vestigate the normative implications of the asymmetric uncertainty. I first put the model in
perspective by examining its two polar cases, before looking at the effect of asymmetry on the
quality of the DM’s decision and on welfare.
The model actually represents a continuum of situations between two polar cases: 1) β =
1
2
, no asymmetry: η and φ have the same distribution and competition between A and B is
completely symmetric; 2) β = 1, fully asymmetry: only η (and only A) matters. The analysis
of these two cases helps to understand how the introduction of asymmetry and its value β affect
a) the DM’s decision rule, b) communication from A and B in equilibrium, and importantly c)
the probability that the DM will make a mistake. In both cases there is a unique equilibrium.
The derivations are similar to those for the main model. I present those equilibria below with
the corresponding ex ante decision probabilities from the DM.
1) Equilibrium for the symmetric case, β = 1
2
. There exists a unique equlibrium where:
• the DM choosesX = a ifE (η|mA)+E (φ|mB) > 0,X = b if ifE (η|mA)+E (φ|mB) <
0, and randomizes between the two with probability 1
2
if E (η|mA) + E (φ|mB) = 0.
Furthermore, in equilibrium the DM is always indifferent and randomizes if she receives
two empty messages, i.e. E (η|mA = ∅) + E (φ|mB = ∅) = 0.
• A and B both play a threshold strategy: when informed, A reveals if η > E (η|mB = ∅)
and hides otherwise; when informed, B reveals if φ < E (φ|mB = ∅) and hides otherwise.
• The thresholds are symmetric:
E (η|mA = ∅) = −E (φ|mB = ∅) = −1
ρ
(β − 1)
(
ρ+ 2
√
−ρ+ 1− 2
)
(3.8)
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• Ex ante, the DM chooses X = a and X = b with equal probability: Pr (X = a) =
Pr (X = b) = 1
2
2) Equilibrium for the fully asymmetric case, β = 1. There exists a unique equlibrium where:
• the DM chooses X = a if E (η|mA) > 0, X = b if if E (η|mA) < 0, and randomizes
between the two with probability 1
2
if E (η|mA) = 0. Furthermore, in equilibrium the DM
always chooses X = b when she receives an empty message, i.e. E (η|mA = ∅) < 0.
• A plays a threshold strategy: when informed, A reveals if η ≥ 0 and hides otherwise.
• Ex ante, the DM chooses X = a with probability Pr (X = a) = 1
2
ρ, and X = b with
probability Pr (X = b) = 1− 1
2
ρ
With regards to the DM’s ex ante decision, the symmetric case (β = 1
2
) unsurprisingly
yields no bias towards A or B. In the fully asymmetric case (β = 1) however, the DM’s ex ante
decision is similar to the main model: A is being penalized when he sends an empty message,
which induces a bias against him in the DM’s decision. It is also worth noting how the ex ante
probabilities of choosing X = a or X = b are the same, whether there are two competing
information providers that communicate on distinct and asymmetric aspects of the decision, or
just one that communicates on one aspect.
Concerning A and B’s communication in equilibrium, we can see that B will reveal his
signal as often in the symmetric case as in the main model, regardless of the value of β. In
the fully asymmetric case, B becomes irrelevant. A on the other hand, reveals his signal as
often as B in the symmetric case, but then less and less often as the asymmetry gets larger (cf.
(3.7), Pr (η > −E (φ|mB = ∅)) is decreasing in β). This result is relatively standard: more
symmetric competition between information providers induces them reveal their signal more
often in equilibrium.
Up til now, we have seen how the asymmetry between η and φ affects the DM’s choice
between X = a and X = b in equilibrium, but not how it affects the accuracy of her decision.
I define it here as the ex ante probability that the DM will make the correct choice, i.e. choose
X = a when η + φ > 0, and X = b when η + φ < 0. In order to evaluate how accurate the DM
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is we can then compute the ex ante probability P ∗ (miss) that the DM will make a mistake in
equilibrium:
P ∗ (miss) = Pr (X = a|η + φ < 0) + Pr (X = b|η + φ > 0) (3.9)
=
1
2βρ
(ρ− 1)
(
4β + 2ρ+ 4
√
1− ρ− 3βρ− 4β
√
1− ρ− 4
)
(3.10)
For completeness, we can directly compute the value of P ∗ (miss) in the symmetric case
(β = 1
2
) and the fully asymmetric case (β = 1), or use the expression above. P ∗ (miss) is
continuous and decreasing in β, for β ∈ [1
2
, 1
]
.
Furthermore, given the players’ strategies in equilibrium, we can compute the ex ante welfare
of the game, represented by the expected utility from the DM in equilibrium E∗ (UDM):
E∗ (UDM) =
Pr ({mA,mB} = {η, ∅})E (η + φ| {mA,mB} = {η, ∅})
+ Pr ({mA,mB} = {∅, φ} (−E (η + φ| {mA,mB} = {∅, φ})))
+ Pr ({mA,mB} = {η, φ} ∧ η + φ > 0)
E (η + φ| {mA,mB} = {η, φ} ∧ η + φ > 0)
+ Pr ({mA,mB} = {η, φ} ∧ η + φ < 0)
(−E (η + φ| {mA,mB} = {η, φ} ∧ η + φ < 0))
+ Pr ({mA,mB} = {∅, ∅} (−E (η + φ| {mA,mB} = {∅, ∅})))
(3.11)
E∗ (UDM) is also continuous and increasing in β, for β ∈
[
1
2
, 1
]
, which yields the second
proposition.
Proposition 3.2. More asymmetry leads to a less informed but more accurate decision ex ante,
and to more welfare. As β becomes larger, A communicates less often, but the ex ante probability
that the DM makes a mistake decreases and her expected utility increases.
The fact that asymmetry improves the quality of the DM’s decision and her expected utility
even though less information is communicated is due to η and φ being investigated separately.
Competition between A and B does make them reveal their signals more often than if they were
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the only information provider, but it also induces more mistakes when the DM receives empty
messages because both of them play threshold strategies on distinct aspects of the decision. For
instance, when in equilibrium A sends a messagemA = {η}, with η ∈ [−E (φ|mB = ∅) , 1− β]
and B remains silent and sends mB = ∅, the DM will always choose X = a. If B is silent
because he is informed and φ > E (φ|mB = ∅), the DM is making the right choice. However
if B is silent because he is uninformed, there is a positive probability that the DM is making
a mistake since, ex ante, Pr (φ < −η|η ∈ [−E (φ|mB = ∅) , 1− β]) > 0. A similar reasoning
applies when B sends an informative message and A stays silent, and when both of them send
an empty message.
The asymmetry biases the DM’s decision towards B and makes her mistakes more one-sided:
in expectations the DM will make a mistake in favor of B more often:
Pr (X = a|η + φ < 0) < Pr (X = b|η + φ > 0) (3.12)
However, the asymmetry also reduces the size of the mistake: as β grows larger, then the
probability that A is hiding a very low value of η relatively to φ also grows larger. In other words,
a larger asymmetry increases the likelihood that the DM’s bias against A is actually right. In
contrast, symmetric competition between A and B, when β = 1
2
, leads to an unbiased decision
in equilibrium (Pr (X = a) = Pr (X = b) = 1
2
), but it also increases the probabilities of making
a mistake both in favor of A and in favor of B.Thus, the asymmetry biases the DM’s decision
in equilibrium, but the larger the asymmetry the more valid this bias becomes, and the more the
DM’s expected utility increases.
3.4.4 Advocates vs. single partisan
In this section, I ask a broader question: is advocacy a good organizational choice for the DM?
One pivotal feature of the model is that information about η and φ are collected and commu-
nicated separately. For this reason, competition between two enfranchised agents who only
collect one signal can actually be detrimental to the DM’s decision, because it provides them
with distinct opportunities to manipulate her. Competition does induce the agents to behave
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more informatively, but it also increases the chances of manipulation. I argued in Proposition
2 that the asymmetry between η and φ can alleviate this issue: it biases the DM’s decision,
but more asymmetry validates this bias and reduces the likelihood of making a mistake. When
competing information providers collect information and communicate about the same aspect(s)
of the decision, then competition leads to more informed and more accurate decisions. In our
model however, the fact that η and φ are investigated separately undermines the positive effects
of competition. This raises the question of whether advocacy is beneficial to the DM, or under
what conditions it can be so.
Model variant with a single partisan
Alternatively, I consider a variant of the model without competition: there is only one agent, A,
with one-sided preferences over the DM’s decision, who collects information and communicates
about both η and φ. In line with the main model, A receives separate signals sη ∈ {η, ∅} and
sφ ∈ {φ, ∅}, which are informative with prior probability Pr (sη = {η}) = Pr (sφ = {φ}) = ρ.
If A is fully informed, he can decide to communicate on both η and φ, or just one aspect, or
none at all, i.e. he can send a message mA ∈ {{η, φ} , {η} , {φ} , ∅}. If A is partially informed,
i.e. if {sη, sφ} ∈ {{η, ∅} , {φ, ∅}}, he can send a partial message mA = {η} if he only knows η,
or mA = {φ} if he only knows φ, or an empty message mA = ∅. Finally, if A does not receive
any informative signal, he can only send an empty message. The rest of the model is otherwise
similar to the one above: the DM’s and A’s payoffs are the same, information is verifiable, and
the timing of the game is similar. The main difference between this variant and the main model
is that A can now use two separate signals to communicate, which augments his opportunities
for manipulation. In order to induce the DM to choose X = a, A can either reveal both signals
when η + φ > 0 if he is fully informed, or send a partial message mA = {η} or mA = {φ} if its
value is high enough to convince the DM.
This variant with a single partisan does not admit an equilibrium where A always truthfully
reveals his signals. Assume that the DM expects him to behave so, then she would chooseX = a
when A reveals both signals and η + φ > 0, but also when A reveals only one positive signal.
For instance, when the DM receives mA = {η} with η > 0, she would infer that A only received
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an informative signal about η and choose X = a. But this gives A incentives to deviate when he
is fully informed and η + φ < 0 but η > 0.
This game admits three equilibria that are qualitatively similar. In these equilibria, A’ com-
munication strategy follows the same pattern: when A is fully informed, he will first try to
persuade the DM to choose X = a with partial messages. If partial messages fail, A will reveal
both signals if η + φ ≥ 0. Otherwise, A will send an empty message. When A is partially
informed, he will try to persuade the DM with a partial message, and if that is not possible he
will send an empty message.
It is always optimal for A to send partial messages first when he is fully informed. If the
DM expects A to reveal both signals first instead, this hampers A’s capacity to manipulate the
DM with partial messages when sending both signals is ineffective, or when A is only partially
informed. Let us assume that, when fully informed, A reveals both signals first, then η only if
sending both signals is ineffective, and then φ only if mA = {η, φ} and mA = {η, ∅} are both
ineffective. If η + φ > 0, A is able to persuade the DM by sending mA = {η, φ} and the DM
chooses X = a. But if A sends a partial message mA = {η}, the DM will update his beliefs as
follows: either A is partially informed and has no information on φ, or A is fully informed and
chose not to reveal both signals because η + φ < 0⇔ φ < −η and:
E (φ|mA = {η}) = ρPr (φ < −η)
ρPr (φ < −η) + (1− ρ)E (φ|φ < −η) (3.13)
Sending mA = {η} makes it harder for A to manipulate the DM with partial messages then,
because the DM will always consider the possibility that A is hiding low values of η + φ. This
decreases A’ chances to manipulate the DM when he is fully informed but also when he is
partiallly informed and can only send partial messages.
If A chooses to reveal partial signals first, this effect is mitigated: let us now assume that
when he is fully informed A reveals φ first, then η, and only if partial messages do not succeed
does he reveal both. When he is partially informed, A sends partial messages first. When A
sends mA = {φ}, the DM cannot infer any information about η: A could be fully informed or
partially informed, so that E (φ|mA = {η}) = 0. If η > 0 the DM will then choose X = a.
So, when A is fully informed, or when he only knows the value of φ, A will reveal φ if φ > 0.
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When A sends mA = {η}, then the DM will update her beliefs as follows: either A is partially
informed and has no information about η, or A is fully informed and η < 0, so that:
E (φ|mA = {η}) = ρPr (φ < 0)
ρPr (φ < 0) + (1− ρ)E (φ|φ < 0) (3.14)
Solving η + E (φ|mA = {η}) in (3.13) and (3.14) shows that A needs higher values of η to
persuade the DM when she expects him to reveal both signals first. The same analysis applies
for all strategies where A sends partial messages first when he is fully informed7. Any strategy
where A reveals both signals first when he is fully informed is thus a dominated strategy.
I describe below one equilibrium of this game, which, arguably, is best suited to make a
comparison with the main model. The three equilibria are qualitatively similar, but this partic-
ular one is chosen for two reasons: 1) it exists for all parameter values whereas the two other
equilibria do not, 2) A’s expected payoffs are always higher in this equilibrium than in the other
two. So, even if I cannot always formally discriminate between these three equilibria, the one
presented below is intuitively the most relevant. Furthermore, the other two equilibria do not
yield additional insights, while the results remain valid.
Equilibrium 1
• The DM choosesX = awhen she receives a non-empty messagemA ∈ {{η, φ} , {η} , {φ}},
and X = b if mA = ∅.
• A plays the following communication strategy in equilibrium:
– When A is fully informed, he sends:
∗ mA = {φ} if φ > 0
∗ mA = {η} if φ ≤ 0 and η > ρ 1−β2ρ−4
∗ mA = {η, φ} if φ ≤ 0, η ≤ ρ 1−β2ρ−4 , and η + φ ≥ 0
∗ mA = ∅ otherwise
7There are three such strategies: a) the one discussed above: send η first, then φ; b) send φ first, then η; c) send
the higher signal first.
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– When A only knows the value of η, he sends:
∗ mA = {η} if η > ρ 1−β2ρ−4
∗ mA = ∅ otherwise
– When A only knows the value of φ, he sends:
∗ mA = {φ} if φ > 0
∗ mA = ∅ otherwise
Details on this equilibrium and the others can be found in the appendix. Given the players’
strategies, we can compute the ex ante probability that the DM will choose X = a in equilib-
rium:
Pr (X = a) = ρ
(4− ρ) (32β − 4ρ+ 3ρ2 − 28βρ+ 5βρ2)
32βρ2 − 128βρ+ 128β (3.15)
This probability is increasing in β, which implies that more asymmetry increases A’s capac-
ity to manipulate the DM. Indeed, as β increases the revealing threshold ρ 1−β
2ρ−4 for η decreases.
Thus, the ex ante probability that A will send a message mA = {η}8 and induce the DM to
choose X = a is increasing in β. As the asymmetry grows larger, A can manipulate the DM
relatively more often, with lower values of η.
We can derive from the equilibrium the ex ante probability P SP (miss) that the DM makes
a mistake in equilibrium, and her expected utility ESP (UDM) (see Appendix). P SP (miss) is
increasing in β, andESP (UDM) is decreasing in β, which means that more asymmetry increases
the likelihood that the DM will make mistake, and decreases welfare. Contrary to the model with
advocates, asymmetry has a negative effect on the quality of the DM’s decision and on welfare
when there is a single partisan providing information to the DM.
Comparing the two organizations.
In order to compare the relative benefits of having two advocates or one single partisan supply-
ing information, I look at the quality of the DM’s decision and welfare across the two models.
8Pr (mA = {η}) = ρPr
(
η > ρ 1−β2ρ−4
)
(1− ρ+ ρPr (φ ≤ 0))
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Formally, I compare P ∗ (miss) and P SP (miss), andE∗ (UDM) andESP (UDM). These expres-
sions depend on the two parameters of the model: the probability ρ ∈ (0, 1) that the information
providers are informed, and the degree of asymmetry β ∈ (1
2
, 1
)
. We have:
∂P ∗ (miss)
∂ρ
< 0,
∂E∗ (UDM)
∂ρ
< 0,
∂P SP (miss)
∂ρ
> 0,
∂ESP (UDM)
∂ρ
> 0 (3.16)
∂P ∗ (miss)
∂β
< 0,
∂E∗ (UDM)
∂β
> 0,
∂P SP (miss)
∂β
> 0,
∂ESP (UDM)
∂β
< 0, (3.17)
An increase in the likelihood that the information providers are informed (increase in ρ)
has similar effects across the two models: it decreases the probability of mistake and increases
welfare. This effect is due to the players’ communication strategy in equilibrium, which follow
the same logic across both models: reveal favorable information or hide and send an empty
message. When ρ increases, the empty messages from the players become more informative.
An empty message is then more likely to be the sign of a player hiding information, rather than
the sign of a player being uninformed. Thus, as ρ increases, the DM is able to extract more
information about η and φ, which improves the quality of her decision and welfare.
An increase in asymmetry (increase in β) has opposite effects across models. When two
advocates supply information to the DM, more asymmetry decreases the probability that the
DM makes a mistake and increases welfare, whereas it increases the probability that the DM
makes a mistake and decreases welfare when there is a single partisan.
The third proposition determines which organization - advocacy or single partisan - performs
better in terms of the quality of the DM’s decision and welfare, for given values of β and ρ.
Proposition 3.3. With regards to the quality of the DM’s decision and welfare:
a) If the probability ρ that the agents are informed is relatively low, advocates perform worse
than a single partisan when the degree of asymmetry β is low, and better when β is high.
b) If ρ is relatively high, then advocates always perform better.
There can be a trade-off between the two models. Relatively to the first-best situation where
the DM would always make informed decisions, both types of organization have negative effects
on the quality of the decision and on welfare. Advocates induce a bias in the DM’s decision,
and a single partisan manipulates the DM’s decision in his favor. However, the negative effects
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of advocay are decreasing in the level of asymmetry, while those caused by a single partisan
increase with it. So, the degree of asymmetry between η and φ can either amplify or reduce the
distortions present in those models. If β is low then, the bias from advocacy is more detrimental
than the manipulation of a single partisan, and competition between two information providers
is less desirable than having only one. As β increases, advocacy then becomes more desirable9.
This trade-off disappears though, when the information providers have a higher chance of
being informed. An increase in ρ mitigates the distortions in both models, but more so in the
case of advocacy. When advocates become more informed, the benefits of competition between
two information providers prevail. Then, advocacy is always more desirable than having a single
partisan.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter presents of model of advocacy where the decision maker is faced with an asym-
metric uncertainty. I show that the asymmetry induces a distortionary bias in the decision, but
that more asymmetry alleviates the negative effects of the bias. I also show that in the presence
of asymmetry a single partisan information provider might be more efficient than advocates.
Nevertheless, advocacy remains preferable when the asymmetry is large, and when the agents
have a high probability of being informed ex ante.
One limitation of the model is that it does not endogenize information collection. The anal-
ysis then focuses on the effects of asymmetry on the incentives to communicate, but not on the
incentives to search or collect information. However, it seems plausible that the positive effects
of increasing asymmetry would still remain to a certain extent. Since the advocate that can send
more extreme messages always gets zero payoffs when he sends an empty message, he would
then always have a strict incentive to search for information. This could in turn increase the
other player’s incentives to collect information, in order to better compete with a more informed
9Looking at the limit cases when β → 12 and β → 1 provides a good illustration of this trade-off: in both cases
the models diverge. For β → 12 this is straightforward: we have two symmetric advocates or one single partisan.
For β → 1 though, both the models may appear to converge towards only one information provider collecting one
piece of information, but that is not the case. As long as β 6= 1, a single partisan still potentially has two signals to
manipulate the DM, whereas an advocate only has one.
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opponent. On the other hand, endogenizing information collection might allow for a separat-
ing equilibrium where the asymmetry would discourage the player that can send less extreme
messages from searching.
Another limitation of the model is that it does not look at contracts. We can compute the
players’ expected payoffs from the game, but since there are no communication costs or infor-
mation collection costs, not much can be said about the advocates’ incentives to participate in
the game. Still, I do find that the expected payoffs of the player that can send the more extreme
messages are relatively lower, and I also show that these expected payoffs do not depend on the
level of asymmetry (see Proposition 1), which opens some avenues for reflexion.
Building on the example in the introduction, let us consider a board of directors seeking
to hire division managers. Following the results of this chapter, the board understands that it
is in the company’s interest to hire very asymmetric managers: a safe one, and a very risky
one. Assuming that the managers’ earnings depend on the board’s investment decision, the first
proposition suggests that, if managers all ask the same wage, it would be more difficult to hire
a risky manager since his expected earnings are lower. On the other hand, if managers ask
for a remuneration that is correlated with their own risk, a very risky manager might be more
willing to take the position with lower expected earnings but higher variance. In this situation,
the board’s objective would be to design contracts where the expected compensation for the
risky manager is high enough so that very risky profiles have a strong incentive to participate
(and increase the asymmetry), but not so much so that it would discourage safe managers (and
decrease the asymmetry).
Lastly, the findings of this chapter seem to outline a commendation of simplicity in organi-
zations: welfare is always higher when there is only one advocate and one issue to communicate
on (β = 1). It is nevertheless difficult to draw any conjectures from this, as organizational
constraints generally make simplicity a very elusive object.
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Equilibrium
Here is the derivation of the equilibrium presented in section 4.2. To make the notation slightly
more concise I write E (x|mi = ∅) as E (x|∅) for x ∈ {η, φ} and i ∈ {A,B}. Since η and
φ and independent, there should be no ambiguity regarding the origin of signal: A only sends
messages about η, and B only sends messages about φ.
The DM’s decision rule
Assume that the DM expects that A plays the following threshold strategy: when informed,
A sends mA = {η} if η > η¯ and hides otherwise; and that B plays the following strategy: when
informed, B sends mB = {φ} if φ < φ¯, and hide otherwise. Furthermore, assume that for the
DM E (η|∅) + E (φ|∅) < 0.
The DM’s optimal strategy is then to choose X = a if E (η|mA) +E (φ|mB) > 0, X = b if
ifE (η|mA)+E (φ|mB) < 0, and randomizes between the two with probability 12 ifE (η|mA)+
E (φ|mB) = 0.
A and B anticipate the DM’s decision rule in equilibrium. Their expected payoffs are then:
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A’s expected payoffs
E (RA (X)) =

(1− ρ)R + ρPr (φ > φ¯)R + ρPr (φ ∈ [−η, φ¯])R
if η > −E (φ|∅) and A reveals
(1− ρ) 1
2
R + ρPr
(
φ > φ¯
)
1
2
R + ρPr
(
φ ∈ [E (φ|∅) , φ¯])R
if η = −E (φ|∅) and A reveals
ρPr
(
φ ∈ [−η, φ¯])R
if η < −E (φ|∅) and A reveals
ρPr
(
φ ∈ [−E (η|∅) , φ¯])R
if A hides
(3.18)
Assume η ≥ −E (φ|∅).
By assumption: E (η|∅) + E (φ|∅) < 0, so we have −η < E (φ|∅) < −E (η|∅).
So Pr
(
φ ∈ [−η, φ¯]) > Pr (φ ∈ [−E (η|∅) , φ¯]) for all η > −E (φ|∅).
So A always reveals when η ≥ −E (φ|∅).
Assume η < −E (φ|∅)
So we have −η > E (φ|∅). And recall that E (φ|∅) < −E (η|∅)
So if
[−η, φ¯] is empty for all η < −E (φ|∅), then [−E (η|∅) , φ¯] is also empty.
Then we have three possible optimal strategies:
1)
[−η, φ¯] 6= ∅, and [−E (η|∅) , φ¯] 6= ∅.
Then A reveals if η > E (η|∅) and hides otherwise.
2)
[−η, φ¯] 6= ∅, and [−E (η|∅) , φ¯] = ∅.
Then A has a strict incentive to reveal if η > −φ¯, and otherwise he is indifferent and hides.
3)
[−η, φ¯] = ∅, and [−E (η|∅) , φ¯] = ∅.
Then A reveals when η ≥ −E (φ|∅), otherwise he is indifferent and hides.
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B’s expected payoffs
E (RB (X)) =

(1− ρ)R + ρPr (η < η¯)R + ρPr (η ∈ [η¯,−φ])R
if φ < −E (η|∅) and B reveals
(1− ρ) 1
2
R + ρPr (η < η¯) 1
2
R + ρPr (η ∈ [η¯,−φ])R
ifφ = −E (η|∅) and B reveals
ρPr (η ∈ [η¯,−φ])R
if φ > −E (η|∅) and B reveals
(1− ρ)R + ρPr (η < η¯)R + ρPr (η ∈ [η¯,−E (φ|∅)])R
if B hides
(3.19)
Assume φ > −E (η|∅)
Recall that E (η|∅) + E (φ|∅) < 0⇔ E (η|∅) < −E (φ|∅).
Thus −φ < E (η|∅) < −E (φ|∅) for all φ > −E (η|∅).
So that Pr (η ∈ [η¯,−φ]) < Pr (η ∈ [η¯,−E (φ|∅)]) for all φ > −E (η|∅), so B always hides
when φ > −E (η|∅).
We have then two possible optimal strategies:
1) [η¯,−φ] 6= ∅ and [η¯,−E (φ|∅)] 6= ∅.
Then B reveals if φ < E (φ|∅) and hides otherwise.
2) [η¯,−φ] 6= ∅ and [η¯,−E (φ|∅)] = ∅.
Then B reveals if φ > −η¯, and B is indifferent otherwise.
I solve for the equilibrium by going through the 6 different possibilities. Only one does not
lead to a contradiction: case 3) from A and 2) from B.
A and B’s equilibrium strategies are then: when informed, A reveals if η > η¯,
η¯ = −E (φ|mB = ∅) and hides otherwise; when informed, B reveals if φ < φ¯, φ¯ = E (φ|mB = ∅)
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and hides otherwise.
We have:
η¯ = −φ¯ = 1
ρ
(1− β)
(
ρ+ 2
√
−ρ+ 1− 2
)
(3.20)
In equilibrium, the following conditions must hold:
1) η¯ ∈ [−β, β] and φ¯ ∈ [β − 1, 1− β].
2) E (η|∅) + E (φ|∅) < 0
Both conditions are always satisfied for β ∈ [1
2
, 1
]
.
3.A.2 Proof of proposition 1
Pr (X = a) can be computed graphically, by representing all possible pair (η, φ) in a two-
dimensional space, which is a rectangle of area 4β (1− β). Pr (X = a) is then the fraction
of the space where, given A, B, and the DM’s equilibrium strategies, a pair (η, φ) leads to the
DM choosing X = a.
We then have:
Pr (X = a) =
 ρ2 14β ((β + η¯) 2 + 12 (1− η¯)2)
+ (1− ρ) ρ 1
4β
((β + η¯) 2) + (1− ρ)2 + (1− ρ) ρ
 (3.21)
=
1
2
ρ
Which we obtain by plugging in η¯ = 1
ρ
(1− β) (ρ+ 2√−ρ+ 1− 2).
By the same method we then have:
Pr (X = b) = 1− 1
2
ρ (3.22)
3.A.3 Proof of proposition 2
P ∗ (miss) is computed with a similar method as above.
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In order to compute the value of E∗ (UDM), we need an expression for the distribution of
a random variable z = E + F , where E ∼ U [η¯, β], and F ∼ U [β − 1, φ¯], so that we can
compute the ex ante expected value of η + φ when both A and B reveal their signals.
The expression for the convolution of E and F is:
f (z) =

1
(β+φ¯)(1−β+φ¯)
(
1− β + φ¯+ z) if z ∈ [β − 1− φ¯, 0]
1
(β+φ¯)
if z ∈ [0, 2β − 1]
1
(β+φ¯)(1−β+φ¯)
(
β + φ¯− z) if z ∈ [2β − 1, β + φ¯]
(3.23)
where φ¯ = 1
ρ
(β − 1) (ρ+ 2√−ρ+ 1− 2)
Then we have:
E∗ (UDM) =
Pr ({mA,mB} = {η, ∅})E (η + φ| {mA,mB} = {η, ∅})
+ Pr ({mA,mB} = {∅, φ} (−E (η + φ| {mA,mB} = {∅, φ})))
+ Pr ({mA,mB} = {η, φ} ∧ η + φ > 0)
E (η + φ| {mA,mB} = {η, φ} ∧ η + φ > 0)
+ Pr ({mA,mB} = {η, φ} ∧ η + φ < 0)
(−E (η + φ| {mA,mB} = {η, φ} ∧ η + φ < 0))
+ Pr ({mA,mB} = {∅, ∅} (−E (η + φ| {mA,mB} = {∅, ∅})))
(3.24)
= − 1
12β
ρ
β − 1
 ρ+ 6β2 − 6β3 − 6φ2 − 3βρ+ 3φρ+ 6βφ2 + 3β2ρ
−β3ρ+ 3φ2ρ+ φ3ρ− 3βφ2ρ+ 3β2φρ− 6βφρ

Plugging in the value of φ¯, we can then compute the derivative of E∗ (UDM) with respect to
β, which is always positive.
3.A.4 Other equilibria in the single partisan model
There are two other equilibria of the game. I present them below. For both equilibria, we
can compute the ex ante probability that the DM will choose X = a, which can be shown to
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be always lower than in the equilibrium presented in the main text. The main feature of this
equilibrium was that when A is fully informed, he will rather send φ first if φ is high enough. In
the second equilibrium presented below, A sends η first when he is fully informed and η is high
enough. In the third equilibrium, A will send whichever signal is higher first when he is fully
informed.
One notable difference between these equilibria and the one in the main text is that the
expected payoffs from the DM are increasing in β. However, when we compare these equilibria
to the advocacy model, we arrive to the same result: with regards to welfare the single partisan
model fares better when ρ and β are relatively low.
Equilibrium 2
• The DM choosesX = awhen she receives a non-empty messagemA ∈ {{η, φ} , {η} , {φ}},
and X = b if mA = ∅.
• A plays the following communication strategy in equilibrium:
– When A is fully informed, he sends:
∗ mA = {η} if η > 0
∗ mA = {φ} if η ≤ 0 and φ > βρ4−2ρ
∗ mA = {η, φ} if η ≤ 0, φ ≤ βρ4−2ρ , and η + φ ≥ 0
∗ mA = ∅ otherwise
– When A only knows the value of η, he sends:
∗ mA = {η} if η > 0
∗ mA = ∅ otherwise
– When A only knows the value of φ, he sends:
∗ mA = {φ} if φ > βρ4−2ρ
∗ mA = ∅ otherwise
Equilibrium 3
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• The DM choosesX = awhen she receives a non-empty messagemA ∈ {{η, φ} , {η} , {φ}},
and X = b if mA = ∅.
• A plays the following communication strategy in equilibrium:
– When A is fully informed, he sends:
∗ mA = {η} if η > − 13ρ (β − 1)
(
ρ+ 2
√−ρ+ ρ2 + 1− 2) and η > φ
∗ mA = {φ} if φ > 13 βρ
(
ρ+ 2
√−ρ+ ρ2 + 1− 2) and φ > η
∗ mA = {η, φ} if η ≤ − 13ρ (β − 1)
(
ρ+ 2
√−ρ+ ρ2 + 1− 2),
φ ≤ 1
3
β
ρ
(
ρ+ 2
√−ρ+ ρ2 + 1− 2), and η + φ ≥ 0
∗ mA = ∅ otherwise
– When A only knows the value of η, he sends:
∗ mA = {η} if η > − 13ρ (β − 1)
(
ρ+ 2
√−ρ+ ρ2 + 1− 2)
∗ mA = ∅ otherwise
– When A only knows the value of φ, he sends:
∗ mA = {φ} if φ > 13 βρ
(
ρ+ 2
√−ρ+ ρ2 + 1− 2)
∗ mA = ∅ otherwise
3.A.5 Proof of proposition 3
P SP (miss) and ESP (UDM) are computed with a similar method as P ∗ (miss) and E∗ (UDM)
respectively. Below we give a rough sketch of the proof for the comparison of P ∗ (miss) and
P SP (miss). Comparing E∗ (UDM) and ESP (UDM) follows the same logic.
Since ∂P
∗(miss)
∂β
< 0 and ∂P
SP (miss)
∂β
> 0, then P ∗ (miss) = P SP (miss) either has a unique
solution β˜, where P ∗ (miss) > P SP (miss) if β < β˜, and P ∗ (miss) < P SP (miss) if β > β˜,
or there is no solution and P ∗ (miss) is always greater or always smaller than P SP (miss).
Solving P ∗ (miss) = P SP (miss) we find that there exists such a β˜, however β˜ ∈ [1
2
, 1
]
only if ρ is below a certain threshold ρ˜.
Chapter 4
Earmarks
4.1 Introduction
The popular press in the US describes earmarks as ”symptoms of a broken spending system”, a
”gateway to corruption”, but also a ”political carrot” that ”produces legislation”1. Earmarks are
legislative provisions that assign federal funds to specific projects. They are inserted into larger
bills by individual members of Congress, usually for the purposes of financing local projects
in their constituencies. Earmarks bypass regular allocation processes and let politicians chan-
nel money to their district with relative discretion2. By contrast, most other federal funds are
distributed through formulas and programs over which an individual representative has only a
limited influence.
Earmarking provides politicians with opportunities to fund local projects, for which they
1See for instance:
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/40128623/ns/politics-capitol hill/t/earmark-dispute-splits-gop-
senators/#.VGJeeTSG-jc
http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickungar/2012/12/29/why-congress-cannot-operate-without-the-bribing-power-of-
earmarks/
2According to the official definition provided by the Office of Management and Budget: ”Earmarks are funds
provided by the Congress for projects, programs, or grants where the purported congressional direction (whether
in statutory text, report language, or other communication) circumvents otherwise applicable merit-based or com-
petitive allocation processes, or specifies the location or recipient, or otherwise curtails the ability of the executive
branch to manage its statutory and constitutional responsibilities pertaining to the funds allocation process.”. see
http://earmarks.omb.gov/earmarks-public/
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can claim direct credit by their constituents. As such, many view earmarks as instrumental for
passing bills in Congress because party leaders can use them to sway the representatives’ votes
on legislation. However, for many others earmarking has devolved into a practice of vote-buying
that epitomizes wasteful spending and pork barrel politics. Yet, in spite of receiving considerable
attention in the popular press, evidence on the role of earmarks in the legislative process and on
the incentives they provide is scarce. This chapter addresses these questions, providing some of
the first systematic evidence on the effects of earmarks on the legislative process and on elections
in the US House of Representatives.
The US House of Representatives implemented a moratorium on earmarks in 2011. In this
chapter, I exploit the introduction of the moratorium to estimate the effects of earmarks on con-
gressional voting for legislation, campaign contributions and spending, and electoral outcomes.
Officially, the purpose of the moratorium was to end a spending practice that only served the
politicians’ interests and aggravated the public deficit, even though earmarks had never repre-
sented more than 0.05% of the total federal budget3. Interestingly, a year later John Boehner
- the Speaker of the House of Representatives, who had advocated the moratorium, remarked
on the difficulties that it had generated for legislative action (see quote)4. However, earmarks
were effectively discontinued in 2010, one year before the moratorium. The public perception
of earmarks had grown bad enough that the House leaders from both parties proposed to rein
in their distribution in order to garner support for the coming elections, even though members
of Congress had already submitted requests for earmarks then. Furthermore, the 2010 budget
did not pass on time, which de facto prevented the distribution of earmarks that year. Although
Representatives were still expecting to receive earmarks in 2010, they did not. Earmarks were
not handed out later either, since the moratorium was in effect by the time Congress passed the
budget.
Ironically, the end of earmarks can be used as a means to assess their effects on US Repre-
sentatives and the legislative process. Using detailed data on earmarking history, I exploit the
events of 2010 as an exogenous variation in earmarking and estimate the effects that the loss of
earmarks had on congressional voting, electoral outcomes, campaign spending and contributions
3According to the detailed data on earmarks for the years 2007 to 2009.
4See http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1204/29/sotu.01.html for a transcript of the interview.
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collected for the electoral campaign.
In 2007, the US Congress made it compulsory for its members to disclose their sponsorship
of earmarks. This makes it possible to identify exactly which members of Congress sponsored
an earmark, and the amounts of federal spending they obtained5. Consequently, there is detailed
data on earmarks that were distributed in 2007, 2008 and 2009. In the empirical analysis, I
then consider the period 2007-2010 in the US House of Representatives, and test the hypothesis
that earmarks were used to gather support for the legislative agenda of the party leaders. Using
roll call data, I measure the Representatives’ propensity to deviate from their party legislative
agenda, and estimate how much it was affected by the earmark stoppage. Furthermore, I estimate
the effects of the loss of earmarks on vote shares in the elections. I also estimate the effects on the
Representatives’ expenditures on their electoral campaign, and on the amounts of contributions
they collected to finance them.
The analysis reveals an astonishing discrepancy between the substantial impact of earmarks
on the legislative process and the tiny share of the total budget they represent - less than a
tenth of one percent. The results show that legislative support for the party line is tremendously
sensitive to the availability of earmarks. After earmarks were discontinued, Representatives
were much less likely to vote alongside their party leaders. Specifically, the loss of earmarks
induced deviations from the party line to increase by at least 15 percent across all votes on
legislation. With regards to the effects of earmarks on electoral outcomes, the results show that
the earmark stoppage cost the Representatives about 1 percent of the votes in the subsequent
elections. The results also show that, without earmarks, Representatives ran more expensive
campaigns and collected significantly more money from Political Action Committees6 (PACs),
that represent special interests.
These findings imply that because earmarks made re-election more likely party leaders could
use them to facilitate agreements on legislation. Accordingly, the earmark stoppage weakened
party voting discipline and undermined the incumbents’ electoral prospects. The findings also
5Prior to 2007, there was no disclosure requirements. There is data on earmarks before 2007, compiled by Cit-
izens Against Government Waste (www.cagw.org). However it does not match earmarks with individual members
of Congress, and it is probably not exhaustive.
6Political Action Committees (PACs) are organizations created by businesses, unions, associations, interest
groups or parties for the purpose of influencing federal elections.
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suggest that Representatives ran more expensive electoral campaigns in order to mitigate the
electoral consequences of the earmark stoppage, and that they financed the increase in campaign
expenditures by seeking additional contributions from special interests. Thus, while the mora-
torium has been upheld as a safeguard against particularistic politics, it may actually have given
special interests more influence over politicians. I conclude that earmarks are, in fact, better for
the legislative process.
The most significant contribution of this chapter relates to the literature on distributive pol-
itics7. This chapter provide some of the first systematic evidence on the effects of distributive
policies on the legislative process. Prior empirical studies have focused on the determinants of
the allocation of distributive policies (e.g. Balla et al. (2002); Knight (2008); Carrol and Kim
(2010); Lazarus (2010)). However, evidence on their effects on the legislative process is very
scarce. Lee (2003) and Evans (2004) have shown that representatives were more likely to vote
for a bill if they have earmarks attached to it, but this evidence has several limitations. First,
these studies do not identify a causal link between earmarking and the representatives’ votes,
so that they cannot ascertain whether earmarks were used to sway votes on the bills, or repre-
sentatives attached earmarks to bills that were already assured to pass. Moreover, these studies
focus on specific bills. Their results may not extend to other congressional votes, and Repre-
sentatives who earmark on those bills may be different from those who do not. Additionally,
these studies cannot account for the possibility that earmarks may have an effect across differ-
ent congressional votes, not necessarily related to the bills that contain earmarks. This chapter
offers several improvements. The events of 2010 provide a counterfactual - a world where rep-
resentatives cannot earmark. The fact that Representatives did not receive any earmarks in 2010
although they expected them is exploited as an exogenous variation, that allows to estimate the
causal effects of the loss of earmarks on congressional voting and on elections. Furthermore,
this chapter uses the most exhaustive earmark data available and the representatives’ entire vot-
ing record during the sample period. The effects of earmarks are also differentiated across the
different types of congressional votes, by using various subsamples of the roll call data.
Importantly, the findings of this chapter question the predictions of the standard models on
7Distributive politics generally refer to the allocation of public goods and services to specific localities or groups.
4.1 Introduction 55
distributive politics (e.g., Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981); Ferejohn and Krehbiel (1987)).
Previous theoretical studies generally argue that distributive policies create a common pool prob-
lem and generate inefficient public spending. In this chapter, I show that earmarks represented a
tiny share of the federal budget while creating powerful incentives for more productive lawmak-
ing, which may actually improve efficiency in policy-making.
Within the literature on distributive politics, this chapter also adds to previous studies that
examine the effects of public spending on elections. For instance, Levitt and Snyder (1997) show
that increased federal spending in the House Representatives’ districts increases their chances of
re-election. Nevertheless, the responsibility of individual representatives for the public spending
in their district is difficult to establish. Most public spending at the federal level is determined by
rules and programs over which an individual representative has little influence. In comparison,
the earmark data used in this chapter provides an individual measure of discretionary spending8.
Closely related to this chapter, Strattman (2013) adopts an instrumental variable approach -
using state population and the presence of Senator on the Senate Appropriations committee
as instruments for earmarks - and shows that earmarks increase the chances of re-election9.
Although it finds similar results, the analysis in this chapter uses a different approach: it employs
a difference-in-differences strategy and looks at the effects of the loss of earmarks on electoral
performance and campaign finance.
This chapter also contributes to the literature on the determinants of congressional voting.
This literature has mainly focused on external factors of influence, such as constituents’ eco-
nomic interests, ideology, or special interests (e.g., Peltzman (1985); Levitt (1996); Strattman
(2002); Mian, Sufi and Trebbi (2010)). A few studies have underlined the importance of
logrolling, or vote-trading between the representatives (e.g., Ferejohn (1989); Strattman (1992)),
but there is still little evidence showing that political factors from within Congress have a sys-
tematic influence on the legislative process. In this chapter, I show that party leaders could use
8There also exists evidence of the effects of electoral incentives on discretionary spending in state legislatures
(see Aidt and Shvets (2012))
9However, Shepsle et al. (2009) have shown that the allocation of earmarks in the US Congress is influenced
by electoral cycles in the House and the Senate: every two years the Senate is renewed by a third whereas all
Representatives are up for reelection. The authors show that Senators seeking reelection will try to obtain more
earmarks for their state, and that the House corrects for this cyclical bias. Thus, using state-based variables as
instruments for earmarks may compromise the estimations.
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earmarks to influence the representatives, and that they had a substantial impact on their voting
behavior.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section II provides some theoretical back-
ground for the empirical analysis, Section III gives additional information on earmarks in the
US House of Representatives, Section IV describes the data and the methodology, Section V
presents the results, and Section VI concludes.
4.2 A simple model of policy-making
In this chapter, earmarks are identified as an important bargaining instrument within the US
legislative process and the empirical analyis will show that they significantly affected the rep-
resentatives’ voting behavior because they provided them with electoral benefits. This section
provides some theoretical background for the empirical findings with a simple model of policy-
making.
Drawing from Grossman and Helpman (2001), policy-making is represented as a common
agency game with three players: a politician, her party leadership, and an interest group. The
politician (P ) is a lawmaker and has to make a unidimensional decision p. Before she makes her
decision, the party leadership (L), and the interest group (IG) try to influence her by offering
campaign contributions C (p) and public funds G (p), respectively, that are both contingent on
the policy choice p. The leadership and the interest group represent two different types of
influence: one comes from within the legislative institutions, while the other represents external
special interests.
The politician’s objective is to maximize her chances of reelection, which are decreasing
in the distance between her decision p and the policy D that would be optimal from her con-
stituents’ perspective, increasing in the amount of campaign contributions C (p) that the politi-
cian collects, and increasing in the amount of public funds G (p) that the politician manages to
channel to her district. Her objective function is simply defined as a weighted sum of these three
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terms. The politician’s problem then reads:
max
p
UP = − (p−D)2 + αC (p) + βG (p) (4.1)
The party leadership (L) has an interest in p, and tries to influence the politician’s decision by
offering her discretionary benefits for her district, according to the schedule G (p). The optimal
policy for the leadership is normalized at 0. The party leadership then designs a schedule G (p)
that solves :
max
G(p)
UL = −p2 −G (p) (4.2)
The interest group (IG) also has an interest in p, and tries to influence the politician’s deci-
sion by offering her campaign contributions, according to the schedule C (p). The objective of
the interest group is to bring p as close as possible to its optimal policy E. So, the interest group
designs the optimal contribution schedule that solves:
max
C(p)
U IG = − (p− E)2 − C (p) (4.3)
The game is in two stages and the timing is as follows: first, the party leadership and the
interest group simultaneously present their schedules G (p) and C (p) to the politician. Then,
the politician chooses p and receives G (p) and C (p), according the schedules that were offered
in the previous stage.
The schedules C (p) and G (p) are assumed to be nonnegative for any value of p: the leader-
ship and the interest group can give to the politician but they cannot take funds or contributions
from her. In order to simplify the analysis, I also assume that C (p) and G (p) are differen-
tiable whenever they are strictly positive (see Grossman and Helpman (2001) for more details).
C (p) and G (p) represent promises of payments contingent on p. In this one-shot game, it is
assumed that the party leadership and the interest group commit to those schedules, so that they
cannot renege on the payments once the policy has been set. Likewise, the politician cannot
change her choice of policy once the payments have been made. While this may seem like a
strong assumption, it is motivated by the fact that commitment may arise endogenously if the
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game were repeated: the players would make good on their promises in order to ensure future
collaborations.
Without loss of generality it is assumed that D ≥ 0. This game is solved using backwards
induction. An equilibrium consists of a policy p∗, a contribution schedule C∗ (p) and a public
funds schedule G∗ (p), such that UP , U IG, and UL are maximized.
While there exist many equilibria in this game, they all have the same unique policy outcome.
Solving the game yields the following: in the second stage of the game, the politician chooses
p∗ in order to maximize UP , given the schedules G (p) and C (p). Thus, p∗ solves:
−2 (p−D) + αdG
dp
+ β
dC
dp
= 0 (4.4)
Then, in the first stage of the game, the leadership and the interest group respectively choose
their optimal schedules G∗ (p) and C∗ (p), so that they maximize their respective utilities when
p = p∗. Thus, in equilibrium the optimal schedules C∗ (p) and G∗ (p) satisfy the following
conditions:
2p∗ =
dG∗
dp∗
(4.5)
2 (p∗ − E) = dC
∗
dp∗
(4.6)
The leadership and the interest group take the schedule of the other player as given. In
equilibrium, the amountsG∗ (p∗) and C∗ (p∗) must be large enough so that the politician accepts
their offers, which implies the following participation constraints:
C∗ (p∗) ≥ max
p
[
(p−D)2 + αG∗ (p)]− [(p∗ −D)2 + αG∗ (p∗)] (4.7)
G∗ (p∗) ≥ max
p
[
(p−D)2 + βC∗ (p)]− [(p∗ −D)2 + βC∗ (p∗)] (4.8)
These participation constraints always hold in equilibrium: both the leadership and the inter-
est group give to the politician, as it would be suboptimal for them to let the other player exert
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influence alone. This yields the following equilibrium policy:
p∗ =
D + βE
1 + α + β
(4.9)
There exist many equilibria which all have the same policy outcome p∗, and where the op-
timal schedules G∗ (p) and C∗ (p) satisfy conditions (5) and (7), and (6) and (8) respectively.
Furthermore, in equilibrium, the following hold:
∂p∗
∂G∗
= −1
2
(
1 + α + β
D + βE
)
(4.10)
∂p∗
∂C∗
=
1
2
(
1 + α + β
(1 + α)E −D
)
(4.11)
The equilibrium policy is a weighted average of the optimal points of the three players. It is
more or less biased towards the bliss point of one of the three players, according to how much
the politician values the policy outcome, public funds, and campaign contributions relatively to
each other. Given that there are many equilibria with the same policy outcome, the model does
not allow to pin down the amounts of public funds and campaign contributions that the politician
receives in equilibrium. Nevertheless, conditions (10), (11) and (12) provide some information
about the behavior of the leadership and the interest group. For both the leadership and the
interest group, the purpose of giving additional public funds or additional campaign contribu-
tions is always to bring the policy outcome closer to their own optimal policy. In equilibrium,
their influences on the policy outcome may conflict or complement each other, depending on the
relative positions of their bliss point in the policy space.
By assumption, D ≥ 0 and the leadership’s optimal policy is p = 0. According to conditions
(10) and (11), if E ≥ D
1+α
then 0 ≤ p∗ ≤ E , ∂p∗
∂G∗ ≤ 0, and ∂p
∗
∂C∗ ≥ 0. So, if the objectives
of the interest group are more aligned with those of the politician than those of the leadership,
then the equilibrium policy lies between the leadership’s and the interest group’s bliss points.
Accordingly, public funds and campaign contributions have conflicting motives in equilibrium,
as they try to draw the politician’s decision in opposite directions.
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If −D
β
≤ E ≤ D
1+α
then p∗ ≥ 0 and p∗ ≥ E, ∂p∗
∂G∗ ≤ 0, and ∂p
∗
∂C∗ ≤ 0. As the interest group
becomes more aligned with the party leadership, but the equilibrium policy is still higher than
both of their bliss points, then their objectives concur. Public funds and campaign contributions
complement each other: they both aim at lowering the policy outcome.
Finally, if E ≤ − D
β
then E ≤ p∗ ≤ 0, ∂p∗
∂G∗ ≥ 0, and ∂p
∗
∂C∗ ≤ 0. When the interest group
grows further opposed to the politician, it pulls her decision so much that the leadership actually
tries to counter the interest group’s influence on the politician. In equilibrium, even though the
leadership’s bliss point is lower than that of the politician, it provides her with public funds in
order to increase her policy decision.
In this simple model, there may be a wide variety of special interests that try to cater to the
politician. However, the first two situations above where the objectives of the politician and
those of the interest group are not too divergent (i.e. E ≥ D
β
) are arguably more relevant. On
one hand, a politician is more likely to grant access to special interests whose preferences are
somewhat aligned with hers. On the other hand, an interest group is also more likely to give
contributions and support the reelection of a politician if their policy objectives concur to some
extent. For instance, it is unlikely that a politician who favors family planning and pro-choice
policies would seek the support of anti-abortion organizations, or that these organizations would
help her get reelected.
In reference to the model, the main purpose of the empirical analysis in this chapter is to
measure the effect of G on p. The first challenge is to find appropriate measures for these two
variables. Measures for campaign contributions are straightforward and readily available. In
this chapter, I claim that earmarks are a good measure for G. There is some evidence that the
amount of federal funds flowing into a politician’s district increases her chances of reelection
(see Levitt and Snyder (1997)). However, earmarks are only a small subset of the federal funds
that are allocated to the Representatives’ district. In order for them to be a viable measure, they
must have an effect on elections. The empirical analysis will show that it is the case, and thus
that they were a valid bargaining instrument. With regards to policy, I will not employ a direct
measure of p, but rather a measure of the distance between p and 0, in other words the distance
between the politician’s decisions and the party leadership’s preferred policy. By looking at roll
call votes, I am able to measure the Representatives’ propensity to deviate from the party line
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with regards to policy.
In this model, the decisions on p, G, and C are interdependent, pointing at obvious endo-
geneity problems in the estimation of the effects of these variables on each other. In this chapter,
I address the issue by exploiting an exogenous change in G: the discontinuation of earmarks in
2010. The model can then offer some predictions about the associated change in policy. In the
more relevant situations, where the preferences of the interest do not diverge too strongly from
those of the politician (whenE ≥ −D
β
), then ∂p
∗
∂G∗ ≤ 0: a decrease inG should lead to an increase
in p, and by extension an increase in the difference between p and 0. Thus, the discontinuation of
earmarks should lead the Representatives to deviate from their leadership relatively more often.
However, it will also change how the politicians respond to campaign contributions. Campaign
contributions may also increase or decrease, depending on the special interests that make those
contributions. In order to refine the theoretical predictions, the model is solved again, assuming
G = 0. The equilibrium then consists of a policy p# and a contribution schedule C# (p) such
that UP and U IG are maximized:
p# =
D + βE
1 + β
(4.12)
In equilibrium, C# (p) satisfies:
∂p#
∂C#
=
β + 1
2 (E −D) (4.13)
For all values of D and E in the more relevant range (E ≥ −D
β
), p# ≥ p∗ ≥ 0. So, the
discontinuation of earmarks should induce the Representatives to deviate from their leadership
more often. Furthermore, looking at the absolute value of ∂p
#
∂C#
and ∂p
∗
∂C∗ allows to compare
how much the politician responds to campaign contributions across the two equilibria, whether
it is by increasing or decreasing p. For E ≥ T (α, β,D) ( 1
1+α
D < T (α, β,D) < D), then∣∣∣ ∂p#∂C# ∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣ ∂p∗∂C∗ ∣∣. In other words, for a wide range of interest groups, the discontinuation of
earmarks should make the politicians more sensitive to campaign contributions, and give special
interests better conditions to exert influence, which might increase their incentives to contribute
to electoral campaigns.
62 Earmarks
4.3 Earmarks in the House of Representatives
Earmarks are legislative provisions that are inserted into larger bills. The large majority of
earmarks are in the Appropriations bills, which determine the allocation of federal spending.
These bills are drafted by the Appropriations subcommittees in the House of Representatives and
the Senate. They are approved within the subcommittees, and then by the full Appropriations
committee, before being sent to the floors of the House and the Senate for a vote. Within
those bills, earmarks specify that certains amounts of federal funds be spent on specific projects.
Generally, earmarks provide funds for local projects related to the districts of their sponsors. For
instance, Florida Representative Allen Boyd obtained an earmark in 2009 to fund construction
and maintenance works in an agricultural station in his district.10.
In order to place an earmark into a bill, a member of Congress submits a request at the
subcommittee level. If the request is granted, the earmark is inserted into the bill, which goes
further through the legislative process. The decisions to grant earmarks are generally not de-
bated or voted within the subcommittee, and they are usually handled by each party separately.
The requests are addressed to the chairs of the Appropriations subcommittees - the ”Cardinals”,
or the ranking members from the minority party11, who then choose whether to place an earmark
into the bill or not. These decisions go relatively unnoticed: even though they sum up to con-
siderable amounts, earmarks have always represented a very small share of the federal budget.
For instance: around $20 billion of federal funds were allocated through earmarking in 2009,
but total federal spending that year was set at $3.1 trillion.
In part due to their discretionary nature, earmarks drew suspicions of wasteful spending,
and have been commonly associated with pork barrel spending. In 2007, Congress made it
mandatory for its members to disclose the earmarks they sponsored, making it possible to collect
detailed data on earmark sponsorship for each member of Congress. In 2010, earmarks had
become a sensitive issue. With the congressional elections drawing close, in a context where
the Democrats’ popularity was steadily decreasing, the Democratic leadership in the House
decided to stop giving earmarks allocated to for-profit organizations, hoping that it would be
10See http://www.washingtonwatch.com/bills/show/ED 1595.html
11These positions are considered to be very influential within the House of Representatives. They are usually
held by more senior Representatives, which are appointed by the parties’ leaderships.
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received positively by the voters. However, the Republican leadership in the House quickly
followed by advocating that earmarks be completely revoked, and announced that they would
stop distributing earmarks altogether. These measures were taken when Representatives from
both parties had already submitted requests for earmarks in that year, and they were far from
being unanimously approved within the parties. Senate Democrats openly criticized their House
counterparts. Two days after the Republican leadership announcements, a couple of Republican
Representatives protested by ostensibly submitting new requests. In the months leading to the
2010 congressional elections, it became increasingly clear that Congress would not be able to
pass the budget before the elections12 and that the earmarks that were supposed to be included
in the 2010 budget would not be distributed. Even though the House leaderships’ decisions
to restrict the distribution of earmarks was endogenous to the electoral context, it suddenly
changed the bargaining terms of the legislative process for the individual Representatives. The
fact that Republicans responded to the Democratic move against earmarks with an even stronger
one accentuated the unexpected devaluation of earmarks as bargaining instruments. While the
Representatives did anticipate that earmarks might be discontinued after the 2010 elections,
they still expected to receive some that year. However, the US Congress’ failure to pass the
budget on time de facto prevented their distribution. After a large victory over the Democrats
in the 2010 elections, House Republicans regained the majority and voted a moratorium on
earmarks, which the President confirmed by stating that he would veto any Appropriations bill
that included earmarks.
I use the data on earmarks that became available since 2007, which describe the earmarks
that were placed in the Appropriations bills in 2007, 2008, and 2009. These data were com-
piled by Taxpayers for Common Sense13. So, the data cover all the earmarks passed under the
110th Congress (2007-2008). In the 111th Congress (2009-2010) however, the data cover the
earmarks placed into the bills in 2009 only. No Appropriations bills were passed before the
general elections in 2010, and earmarks have been under a moratorium since then.
Table 1 provides an overview of the Representatives’ earmarking activity for the years 2007,
12Congressional elections are held in November, while the Congress is supposed to pass the budget by the end
of September.
13www.taxpayers.org.
Table 4.1: Earmarks in the House of Representatives
2007 2008 2009 2010
Number of earmarks
Total 8527 7948 7529 0
sponsored by

Democrats only
Republicans only
both parties
4854
2978
695
4530
2756
642
4681
2239
589
Mean (per Representative) 23.73 23.49 22.25 0
Democrats
Republicans
27.08
19.7
28.01
18.05
27.04
18.13
Sponsorship
Solo earmarks 910 882 889 0
Co-sponsored with Senators 4017 3585 3372 0
Representatives without earmarks 14 52 52 435
Amount
Total ($bn) 12.8 13.87 13.62 0
Democrats only
Republicans only
both parties
6.53
4.12
2.15
6.98
4.27
2.32
7.79
3.64
2.19
0
Mean value (per Representative) ($million) 47.3 63.5 58.6 0
Democrats
Republicans
51
42.6
80.4
42.5
71.9
39
0
Mean sponsor-weighted value ($million) 17.7 19.4 22.5 0
Democrats
Republicans
19.1
15.9
21.8
16.5
25.1
18.6
0
Total US federal expenditures ($trillion) 2.73 2.9 3.1 3.46
.
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2008 and 2009. During the period covered by the data, a Representative sponsored (or co-
sponsored), on average around $65 million worth of earmarks each year. Generally, the to-
tal number of earmarks decreased over time, while their total dollar value increased. House
Democrats received more earmarks than the Republicans, most likely because they had the ma-
jority during the period covered by the data (110th and 111th Congresses) and were thus in
control of the Appropriations committee. Moreover, the table shows that the vast majority of
earmarks was sponsored by more than one Representative, and almost half of them were co-
sponsored with Senators. Given that Representatives could request many earmarks and that
their values could differ greatly, earmarking activity might not be accurately represented by the
number of earmarks sponsored, or by the total dollar value. In order to get a more comprehen-
sive overview of earmarking activity, the Table also shows the mean sponsor-weighted value of
earmarks. The dollar value of each earmark is weighted by the number of sponsors. The Table
then shows the average of the total weighted value per Representative. Though it remains a
rough indicator (every sponsor is given the same weight), this measure suggests that earmarking
activity had been increasing from 2007 to 2009.
4.4 Data and methodology
4.4.1 Data
In this chapter, I estimate the effect of earmarks on US Representatives’ voting behavior, on
vote shares in the elections, on campaign spending and campaign contributions. Congressional
voting data and election data are collected over periods of two years, that coincide with the
duration of a Representative’s mandate. The unit of analysis is the individual Representative,
observed over two periods: 2007-2008 and 2009-2010, which cover the 110th and the 111th
Congress. The discontinuation of earmarks is used as an exogenous change in earmarking, that
allows to assess the causal effet of the loss of earmarks in the 2009-2010 period.
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The sample population includes the Representatives for whom there is complete data on ear-
marks, congressional voting and elections from 2007 to 2010. Representatives who were voted
out of office in 2008, those who were newly elected in 2008, and those who did not pursue
reelection in both 2008 and 2010 are excluded from the sample. There are 331 Representa-
tives in the sample (the House sits 435 voting members), 199 Democrats and 132 Republicans.
Democrats retained the majority in the House during the sample period. The composition of the
sample population is discussed in more detail below.
Congressional voting and the party line
Prior studies, as well as an abundance of anecdotal evidence, have indicated that politicians are
willing to trade their votes on specific bills against personal favors, benefits for their districts
or eamarks. This chapter takes a more general approach using roll call data, which documents
every vote cast by every Representative during the sample period. For each vote in the House, I
determine the parties’ official positions by looking at the votes of the party leader and the Whip.
If they cast the same ballot, it is then defined as the party line on that vote. If they do not,
or if they abstain, then the vote is dropped out of the sample. Maintaining the parties’s voting
discipline is one of the main responsibilities of the leaders and the Whips. Thus, looking at their
voting record should give a good indication of whether there was an official party stance on a
vote. Looking only at these two individuals also allows to define the party line loosely enough
to keep a sufficient number of votes in the sample. It is then possible to measure how often
each Representative deviates from her party line. The propensity to deviate from the party line is
then defined as the percentage of a Representative’s votes that were different from the party line.
There are two ways in which a Representative can deviate from the party line: she can abstain,
or vote against the party line. Both these deviations will be examined separately.
Arguably, roll call votes do not all have the same significance: a vote on a health care reform
certainly carries more weight than a vote on inaugurating a local post office. In order to address
that issue, the estimation will be conducted with a subsample of the roll call votes that only
includes major legislative actions: votes on passage of a bill, votes on amendments, and votes
on House Resolutions. Furthermore, I will also use two alternative definitions of the party line in
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order to check the robustness of the results. The first alternative definition imposes an additional
restriction: both the party leader and the Whip must vote similarly, and neither the leader or the
Whip from the other party should agree with them. The second alternative definition stipulates
that if at least 70% of the Representatives from the same party vote similarly, this designates the
party line on that vote. For future references, the first definition will be called leadership line,
and the two alternative ones will be called leadership line with agenda, and member majority
line.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the Representatives’ voting behavior and earmarking
activity over the sample period. With regards to earmarking activity, rather than using the total
of the gross value of the earmarks that a Representative received, the table displays statistics for
the total sponsor-weighted value. For each earmark, its dollar value is divided by the number
of sponsors. As it was mentioned above, this measure should give a more accurate description
of earmarking activity. The analysis will use this measure in all the estimations that follow,
however all the results are identical and stay fully robust when the total dollar value of earmarks
is used. The table also includes statistics for members of the Appropriations committee, who
had an advantage in earmarking given their direct involvement in the budget process: the Table
shows that members of the Appropriations committee earmarked twice as much as the average
Representative.
Notably, the average propensity to deviate is around ten percent across all measures. While
this may seem relatively small, it implies that, on average, Representatives deviated from the
party line on more than 150 votes in both periods. A closer look at the deviations also reveals
that deviations by abstention are much more variable than by votes against the party line. Fur-
thermore, the table shows a general decrease in the propensity to deviate from the party line in
the second period. A plausible explanation for this change is the election of Barack Obama in
2008: it increased the legislative responsibilities of the Democratic majority in the House, which
had to work in concert with the new Administration to pass bills and implement policies.
The statistics presented in Table 2 apply only to the sample population, which excludes
Representatives who were not in office, or who did not run for reelection in both periods. Among
those Representatives are those who left the House by 2008. If earmarks had any effect on the
elections, the sample might then be biased. In order to address this concern, Table 3 provides
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Table 4.3: 60 Representatives who left the House before 2009
Propensity to deviate from leadership (%)
2007-2008 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Leadership line 24.33 20.12 5.41 92.68
Leadership line - subsample
(only major legislative actions)
26.33 19.83 3.66 93.47
Leadership line with agenda 29.93 20.62 3.71 92.57
Majority member line 18.58 19.74 1.23 88.79
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Earmarks weighted value ($million) 44.2 40.7 0.9 203
some information on the characteristics of the 60 Representatives who left the House by the
end of the first period (2007-2008). The table shows that these Representatives had on average
a much higher propensity to deviate from the party line than those included in the sample.
Moreover, the table also shows that the average amount of earmarks they received is in the same
range as for the Representatives in sample population. So, if anything, the sample population
is biased towards Representatives who deviate less from the party line. Which means that if
there actually is selection bias, it could lead to underestimating the effects of earmarks on the
propensity to deviate from the party line within the sample population.
Elections and campaign finance
The discontinuation of earmarks in 2010 prevented incumbent politicians to distribute earmarks
to their constituents. Given their discretionary nature, earmarks allowed politicians to allo-
cate public funds to specific projects in their districts, and to claim direct credit for it. I then
investigates the causal effect of earmarks on vote shares in the elections, and on campaign fi-
nance variables. Looking at vote shares allows to evaluate the politician electoral performance.
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Table 4.4: Electoral data - Summary statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
2007-2008
Election scores (% votes) 68.96 12.28 44.83 100
Individual contributions ($thousands) 675 463 70 2710
PACs contributions ($thousands) 664 458 3 3578
Number of PACs 201.4 95.5 13 604
Campaign spending ($thousands) 1235 760 188 5048
2009-2010
Election scores (% votes) 63.9 12.08 36.57 100
Individual contributions ($thousands) 706 488 44 3080
PACs contributions ($thousands) 719 464 5 2876
Number of PACs 209.1 102.1 12 629
Campaign spending ($thousands) 1436 884 230 5408
N=331
Campaign spending is the amount of money that a candidate spent during electoral campaign.
Campaign contributions are the amounts that the candidate collected in order to finance her cam-
paign. Importantly, the analysis will use data on campaign contributions from Political Action
Committees, which are organizations whose official purpose is to influence elections. There is
an enormous variety of PACs, that can represent a wide range of special special interests, from
any sort of business or industry to religious or ideological movements. Campaign contributions
from PACs are an interesting measure, as they reflect the exposure of a candidate to special
interests, and can be used as proxy to assess their influence on a politician.
Summary statistics on vote shares in the elections and campaign finance are reported in table
4. The 2008 elections were a victory for the Democrats, who gained 21 seats and strenghtened
the majority they had obtained in the 2006 elections. The 2010 elections however, were a large
Republican victory: Republicans gained 63 seats from the Democrats and won the majority
back. Since the data start before the 2008 elections and keep only incumbents who ran for
election in both periods, the sample population includes a majority of Democrats. This explains
the decrease in average election scores in 2010, when Democrats lost the elections.
With regards to campaign finance, table 4 indicates a slight increase in contributions from
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one period to the other, coming from PACs contributions. However, there is a fair amount of dis-
persion among the Representatives in the sample: standard deviations for total, individual and
PACs contributions are quite high in both periods. Notably, PACs contributions represent, on
average, almost half of the total contributions14. Federal electoral regulations limit the amount
that PACs can contribute to $5000 per candidate, which means, as the table shows, that Repre-
sentatives received contributions from a very high number of PACs on average. This suggests
that candidates who wish to collect a significant amount of contributions from PACs will have
to be in contact with a wide variety of special interests.
Data sources
The roll call data was obtained by Voteview15. The congressional data used in this study were
collected by Charles Stewart III and Jonathan Woon16. With regards to elections and campaign
finance, I use data on election races, campaign spending, contributions made by individuals,
contributions made by PACs, and the number of PACs that gave to a candidate. Most of the data
have been compiled by the Federal Election Commission17, and some additional data on PACs
were obtained by the Center for Responsive Politics18. The data on the congressional districts
was collected by the American Community Survey. Finally, data on earmark requests in 2008
and 2009 was collected by scraping on the WashingtonWatch website.
14PACs can make direct contributions, but they can also participate more or less directly in the campaign, by
sponsoring ads in favor of or against a candidate for instance. PACs are expected to report the amounts spent for
engaging in such activities as independent expenditures. The data on PACs contributions also include independent
expenditures, as they were reported to the FEC.
15http://voteview.com
16http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data page.html#2
17www.fec.gov
18www.opensecrets.org
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4.4.2 Empirical specification and identification
I estimate variants of the following model:
Yit = α + β0I (2009− 2010) + β1I (2009− 2010)Earmarksi +Xitγ + δei + it (4.14)
Yit is the outcome variable for Representative i in period t. For the first set of estimations
on voting behavior Yit is the propensity to deviate from the party line. The estimations are
performed on the different measures of the party described above. For the second set of esti-
mations on elections and campaign finance, I will use five outcome variables: vote share in the
elections, campaign spending, campaign contributions from individuals, campaign contributions
from Political Action Committees (PACs), and the number of PACs that made a contribution.
I (2009− 2010) is an indicator variable that takes value 1 in the second period, when the dis-
continuation of earmarks occured. Earmarksi is the (sponsor-weighted) value of all earmarks
that Representative i received from 2007 to 2009. Xit is a vector of covariates that control for
time-varying characteristics of the Representatives and their districts. ei are the fixed effects for
the Representatives, which will control for many features of the politicians and their district. it
is the error term. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level.
β0 estimates the baseline change in the outcome variable between 2007-2008 and 2009-
2010. The causal effect of earmarks on the outcome variable is captured by the coefficient β1.
The identification strategy relies on two assumptions: 1) the discontinuation of earmarks in the
second period is an exogenous change in earmarking, and 2) the unobserved changes in the
outcome variable in the second period are not related to the Representatives’ past earmarking
activity.
With regards to the plausibility of the first assumption, the discontinuation of earmarks in
2010 was an unexpected development for the Representatives: they had already submitted re-
quests for earmarks when the leaderships made their respective announcements to curtail their
distribution, and the fact that Congress failed to pass the budget on time confirmed that no ear-
marks would be handed out that year.
The second assumption concerns the environment in which the discontinuation of earmarks
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occured during the sample period. The sample period 2007-2010 saw significant political and
economic changes: Barack Obama was elected President in 2008, in a time of serious economic
crisis. However, there were no significant changes within the US Congress: both the House
and the Senate remained under Democratic majority during the sample period. With regards to
congressional voting behavior, the specification estimates the effects of the loss of earmarks on
deviations from the party line within the House of the Representatives, within each party. Even
if the election of Barack Obama changed the global legislative agenda, there were no significant
changes in party dynamics within Congress. The House Democratic leadership stayed the same
during the sample period. In the Republican party, the only change in leadership was Rep. Eric
Cantor who succeeded Rep. Roy Blunt as the House minority Whip after the 2008 elections.
However, Eric Cantor had been serving as Deputy Whip for six years under Roy Blunt prior to
his appointment, and he was Blunt’s most logical successor.
The specification also includes a variable that controls for Tea Party membership in 2010,
which was the first time that the Tea Party presented candidates for congressional elections.
There is also a dummy variable controlling for membership on the Appropriations committee in
the second period. Given that members of the Appropriations committee were in a more favor-
able position to obtain earmarks, the effects of the earmark stoppage may possibly be stronger
for them. The specification also controls for electoral pressure in both periods, by including a
dummy variable that takes value 1 if the Representative was engaged in a tight electoral race,
defined as an election where the Representative received less than 55 percent of the votes.
Finally, the specification includes a set of time-varying variables that control for economic
conditions at the district level: unemployment rate, median household income, percentage of
families below the poverty line, and land area (logged). These variables should capture the
effects of changing economic conditions at the district level.
Importantly, the empirical strategy uses the discontinuation of earmarks as an exogenous
change in earmarking in the second period. However, politicians did receive earmarks in 2009.
Since the roll call data and the electoral data are organized in periods of two years, this means
that the earmark stoppage only affected half the second period. Thus, the model may actually
understimate the effects of earmarks.
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4.5 Results
4.5.1 The effects of the earmark stoppage on voting behavior
Main results
Table 5 presents estimates of the effect of the discontinuation of earmarks on the Representa-
tives’ propensity to deviate from the party line, when the party line is defined as the leadership
line (the party leader and the Whip cast the same ballot on a vote). The estimate for the baseline
change in 2009-2010 is negative and significant, which implies that Representatives deviated on
average less from the party line in the second period. As mentioned above, a plausible expla-
nation for this change is the election of Barack Obama as US President in 2008. The change to
a Democratic Administration most likely increased the legislative responsibilities of the House
Democratic majority.
The main finding of these estimations is that the loss of earmarks caused the Representatives
to deviate from the party line relatively more than before. The coefficients indicate that a stan-
dard deviation change in earmarking correspond to an increase of about 1.75 percentage points
in the propensity to deviate from the party line. With respect to the politicians’ voting behavior
in the second period, this means that the loss of earmarks increased the average propensity to
deviate by more than 15 percent, which amounts to about 30 additional votes for which the aver-
age Representatives deviated from her leadership. With regards to the nature of these deviations,
the estimates for specifications (5) and (6) show that most were abstentions rather than votes
against the leadership positions.
Furthermore, Representatives who sat on the Appropriations Committee were in a relatively
more favorable position to obtain earmarks given their direct involvement in drafting Appropria-
tions bills. Indeed, while the average (sponsor-weighted) value of earmarks over the 2007-2010
period is 72.7 $million, the politicians in the Appropriations committee received on average
148 $million over the same period (see Table 2). The estimates from Table 5 reveal that those
politicians deviated from the party line almost twice as much as the others, once earmarks were
discontinued. Together with the coefficient on the interacted earmarking variable, these results
Ta
bl
e
4.
5:
Pr
op
en
si
ty
to
de
vi
at
e
fr
om
th
e
pa
rt
y
lin
e
-l
ea
de
rs
hi
p
lin
e
D
ev
ia
to
ns
fr
om
:
L
ea
de
rs
hi
p
lin
e
-A
ll
vo
te
s
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(o
nl
y
ab
st
en
tio
ns
)
(o
nl
y
vo
te
s
ag
ai
ns
t)
20
09
-2
01
0
ba
se
lin
e
ch
an
ge
-1
.2
87
-1
.5
17
**
*
-1
.8
83
**
*
-2
.8
52
-2
.1
95
-0
.6
57
(1
.0
63
)
(0
.4
72
)
(0
.6
50
)
(1
.8
84
)
(1
.9
55
)
(0
.4
07
)
E
ar
m
ar
ks
(s
ta
nd
ar
di
ze
d)
-0
.7
72
(1
.0
14
)
(2
00
9-
20
10
)i
nt
er
ac
te
d
1.
86
3*
**
1.
92
2*
**
1.
63
9*
**
1.
73
0*
**
1.
46
7*
*
0.
26
4*
w
ith
E
ar
m
ar
ks
(s
ta
nd
ar
di
ze
d)
(0
.6
50
)
(0
.6
41
)
(0
.5
92
)
(0
.5
90
)
(0
.5
97
)
(0
.1
44
)
Ti
gh
tE
le
ct
io
n
R
ac
e
0.
16
3
0.
34
2
0.
43
6
-0
.2
30
0.
66
6*
**
(l
es
s
th
an
55
%
of
th
e
vo
te
s)
(0
.9
25
)
(1
.1
32
)
(1
.1
13
)
(1
.1
76
)
(0
.2
55
)
(2
00
9-
20
10
)i
nt
er
ac
te
d
w
ith
0.
19
5
1.
40
6*
*
1.
48
1*
*
1.
84
3*
**
-0
.3
62
A
pp
ro
pr
ia
tio
ns
C
om
m
itt
ee
m
em
be
r
(0
.8
81
)
(0
.6
72
)
(0
.6
87
)
(0
.6
88
)
(0
.3
09
)
Te
a
pa
rt
y
m
em
be
ri
n
20
09
-2
01
0
-0
.2
30
-0
.8
34
-0
.6
99
-0
.5
30
-0
.1
69
(1
.0
87
)
(2
.1
01
)
(2
.2
01
)
(2
.3
53
)
(0
.3
25
)
di
st
ri
ct
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
-0
.0
75
0
0.
07
91
0.
06
32
0.
01
60
(0
.2
92
)
(0
.8
00
)
(0
.8
41
)
(0
.1
33
)
di
st
ri
ct
m
ed
ia
n
2.
63
1
-3
.6
10
-5
.1
12
1.
50
2
ho
us
eh
ol
d
in
co
m
e
(l
og
ge
d)
(3
.4
24
)
(1
0.
69
)
(1
0.
95
)
(2
.7
49
)
di
st
ri
ct
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
of
fa
m
ili
es
0.
03
87
0.
36
0
0.
30
3
0.
05
72
be
lo
w
th
e
po
ve
rt
y
lin
e
(0
.1
65
)
(0
.5
25
)
(0
.5
67
)
(0
.0
86
0)
di
st
ri
ct
la
nd
ar
ea
(l
og
ge
d)
0.
25
1
(0
.3
73
)
fix
ed
ef
fe
ct
s
(R
ep
re
se
nt
at
iv
e)
no
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
ye
s
O
bs
er
va
tio
ns
66
2
66
2
66
2
66
2
66
2
66
2
R
2
0.
07
3
0.
07
4
0.
07
7
0.
08
1
0.
04
7
0.
12
9
R
ob
us
ts
ta
nd
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s,
cl
us
te
re
d
at
th
e
in
di
vi
du
al
le
ve
l
*
p
<
0.
1,
**
p
<
0
.0
5
,*
**
p
<
0.
01
Table
4.6:
T
he
effects
ofearm
arks
on
voting
behavior-otherm
easures
D
eviations
from
:
leadership
line
m
ajorlegislative
actions
leadership
line
m
em
berm
ajority
w
ith
agenda
line
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(only
abstentions)
(only
votes
against)
2009-2010
baseline
change
-3.353
-2.865
-0.488
-2.337
-3.738**
(2.150)
(2.289)
(0.609)
(2.278)
(1.734)
(2009-2010)interacted
2.009***
1.576**
0.432*
2.068***
1.578***
w
ith
E
arm
arks
(standardized)
(0.682)
(0.664)
(0.230)
(0.733)
(0.533)
TightE
lection
R
ace
0.139
-0.423
0.562
2.090*
1.082
(less
than
55%
ofthe
votes)
(1.309)
(1.408)
(0.387)
(1.230)
(1.091)
(2009-2010)interacted
w
ith
2.170***
2.176***
-0.00577
1.368
0.883
A
ppropriations
C
om
m
ittee
m
em
ber
(0.810)
(0.776)
(0.464)
(0.886)
(0.685)
Tea
party
m
em
berin
2009-2010
-0.524
-0.506
-0.0185
-1.072
-1.735
(2.517)
(2.714)
(0.481)
(2.827)
(1.907)
districtunem
ploym
ent
0.0337
0.107
-0.0733
0.139
0.355
(0.927)
(0.993)
(0.203)
(0.899)
(0.730)
districtm
edian
-4.120
-5.491
1.371
-7.097
0.283
household
incom
e
(logged)
(12.72)
(12.79)
(4.332)
(13.23)
(9.992)
districtpercentage
offam
ilies
0.463
0.401
0.0622
0.369
0.407
below
the
poverty
line
(0.595)
(0.650)
(0.126)
(0.528)
(0.507)
fixed
effects
(R
epresentative)
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
O
bservations
662
662
662
662
662
R
2
0.089
0.045
0.083
0.056
0.101
R
obuststandard
errors
in
parentheses,clustered
atthe
individuallevel
*
p
<
0.1,**
p
<
0.05,***
p
<
0.0
1
4.5 Results 77
strongly suggest that earmarks were used as a bargaining instrument to buy the Representatives’
votes.
Members of the newly formed Tea Party in 2009-2010 do not seem to have deviated more
than other Representatives. Looking at specification (1) that does not include fixed effects,
economic conditions in the districts did not have a significant impact on voting behavior, and
neither did land area.
Table 6 confirms the results obtained with the leadership line measure. The coefficients on
the earmarking variable are always positive and statistically significant, with the subsample of
more important votes, and the two alternative measures of party line. The effect of earmarks
appears to have been even stronger on more important legislative actions, as specifications (1),
(2), and (3) indicate.
Robustness checks
In order to check the robustness of the results, I also estimate the effect of the loss of earmarks on
the probability that a Representative deviates from the party line on a single vote. The following
model is estimated:
Yivt = α+β0I (2009− 2010)+β1I (2009− 2010)Earmarksi+Xitγ+δei+λdiv+ivt (4.15)
The unit of observation is the vote of Representative i on vote v in period t. Yivt is a binary
variable that takes value 1 when the Representative deviates from the party line (defined as the
leadership line). There are then 1054357 observations in the sample. The estimation is also per-
formed using the subsample of roll call votes that only includes major legislative actions. The
variable are the same than above. Additionally, standard errors are clustered at the individual
level, and at the bill level, to account for the fact that a bill may come to the floor of the House
of Representatives more than once. Table 9 in the appendix provides the estimates. The results
show that the earmark stoppage had a positive and statistically significant impact on the proba-
bility that a Representative deviates from her party line on a single vote, and thus confirms the
validity of the findings presented above.
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Another robustness check is performed using a pseudo-experimental approach. Figure 1 in
the appendix plots the distribution of earmarks in the sample population. The graph shows that
there is considerable variation in earmarking among the Representatives, and that a sizeable
fraction received little to no earmarks. These Representatives could then be considered as a
pseudo ‘control group’ in a natural experiment. So, the sample population is sorted into three
groups of equal size, according to their earmarking activity over the period 2007-2009, prior to
the stoppage. The groups are labeled LOW, MEDIUM, and HIGH. The number of groups is
arbitrarily fixed at three. Using a different number of groups does not affect the results qualita-
tively. The sorting is done using the total weighted amount of the earmarks that Representatives
received during the period 2007-2009. The total weighted amount is favored over the total (un-
weighted) amount, since it gives a more informative description of the politicians’ earmarking,
as it was discussed in the previous section. Representatives in the LOW group, those with the
lowest levels of past earmarking, serve as the baseline monitoring the changes occuring in the
treatment period. Arguably, these Representatives should also be the least affected by the stop-
page of earmarks. The MEDIUM and HIGH groups are the pseudo ‘treatment groups’, which
should capture the effects of the earmark stoppage on the outcome variables. The following
specification is estimated:
Yit = α + I (2009− 2010) (β0 + β1MEDIUM + β2HIGH) +Xitγ + δei + it (4.16)
The coefficient β0 estimates the mean change in the outcome variable between the 2008
and the 2010 election cycles, for the Representatives in the LOW group, which is the base-
line. β1 and β2 estimate ”treatment effects” for the Representatives in groups MEDIUM and
HIGH respectively, i.e. those with medium and high levels of earmarking activity before the
earmark stoppage. For instance, β1 estimates the average difference between the baseline and
the MEDIUM group, with regards to the changes in the outcome variable in the second period.
The results are provided in table 10 in the appendix. The outcomes are in line with the
previous estimations, stronger even. They indicate that Representatives who relied most on
earmarks started deviating relatively more than the others when earmarks were discontinued.
Again, these results also stay fully robust across all measures of party line.
4.5 Results 79
4.5.2 The effects of earmarks on elections and campaign finance
Table 7 reports the effects of the earmark stoppage on vote shares in the elections. The estimates
indicate that the earmark stoppage hurt the Representatives in the elections. On average, the
loss of earmarks cost the Representatives almost 1% of the vote shares in the next elections.
Although the coefficients are not large, they appear to be robust and statistically significant.
These results imply that earmarks were helping Representatives win elections before they were
discontinued.
The coefficient for the baseline change in the 2009-2010 period is very negative and very
significant. This estimate reflects the large Republican victory in 2010. Democrats had had the
majority in the House of Representatives since 2007, and they had won the 2008 elections, so
that the sample population in this study is composed of a majority of Democrats. Members of
the newly formed Tea party enjoyed considerable electoral gains in 2010. Unsuprisingly, run-
ning unopposed correlates with high electoral gains. However, being part of the Appropriations
committee after the earmark stoppage does not seem to have any significant effect on the vote
shares. District characteristics do not exhibit any significant effect either. However, given that
there are only two data points for each control variable, it is quite likely that fixed effects capture
a large share of the variations in the outcome variable.
The role of campaign contributions is a potential concern for the estimation: there is most
certainly endogeneity between electoral performance and campaign contributions. Raising more
money and running more expensive campaigns may improve the chances of being elected, but,
at the same time, candidates who are engaged in tight electoral races would then have bigger
incentives to raise contributions, which would bias the estimates. If the earmark stoppage did
hurt the politicians electorally, then it also changed their incentives to raise contributions. Thus,
campaign contributions raise endogeneity concerns, while they could also be a counfounding
variable in the estimation. In order to address these issues, the estimation is performed with and
without campaign contribution variables. The results stay consistent across the estimations.
The effects of the earmark stoppage on campaign finance are reported in Table 8. In order to
give a relatively comprehensive view, four variables are considered: campaign spending, cam-
paign contributions from individuals, campaign contributions from PACs, and the number of
Table 4.7: The effects of earmarks on vote shares in the elections
Vote share in the elections (%votes)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2009-2010 baseline change -4.766*** -5.059*** -6.412*** -6.219***
(0.714) (0.634) (1.810) (1.795)
(2009-2010) interacted with -1.089* -1.031* -0.972* -0.858*
Earmarks (standardized) (0.621) (0.530) (0.520) (0.512)
Tea party member in 2009-2010 10.33*** 10.39*** 10.66***
(1.322) (1.330) (1.326)
Unopposed in the election 29.07*** 29.13*** 28.98***
(2.472) (2.485) (2.396)
(2009-2010) interacted with 0.829 0.841 0.695
Appropriations Committee member (1.557) (1.576) (1.526)
district unemployment 0.335 0.409
(0.623) (0.611)
district median -0.000175 -0.000163
household income (0.000195) (0.000195)
district percentage of families -0.0813 -0.122
below the poverty line (0.349) (0.348)
Campaign contributions -0.00166
from individuals (0.00101)
Campaign contributions -0.00362
from Political Action Committees (PACs) (0.00269)
fixed effects (Representative) yes yes yes yes
Observations 662 662 662 662
R2 0.148 0.035 0.093 0.069
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 4.8: The effects of earmarks on campaign finance
Campaign Contributions Contributions Number
spending from individuals from PACs of PACs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2009-2010 baseline change 72.18 -52.41 51.90 4.523
(141.2) (101.5) (42.99) (11.02)
(2009-2010) interacted with 95.13* -0.0684 31.82*** 5.560**
Earmarks (standardized) (54.28) (40.39) (10.05) (2.431)
Tea party member in 2009-2010 144.0 295.7 -43.41 -7.696
(246.5) (293.2) (29.13) (7.696)
Tight Election Race 547.1*** 117.9** 60.82** 23.18***
(less than 55% of the votes) (107.7) (50.27) (28.96) (8.117)
Unopposed in the election -214.4 -23.46 -22.37 -3.168
(154.3) (84.09) (38.47) (11.32)
(2009-2010) interacted with -50.50 -33.65 -28.58 -2.376
Appropriations Committee member (121.3) (61.49) (28.35) (7.286)
district unemployment 34.93 43.66 1.782 0.645
(53.03) (44.37) (11.77) (3.266)
district median -0.00181 0.00755 -0.00127 -0.000491
household income (0.0221) (0.0148) (0.00514) (0.00129)
district percentage of families -20.19 -6.857 -6.988 -1.776
below the poverty line (30.51) (22.39) (8.137) (2.058)
fixed effects (Representative) yes yes yes yes
Observations 662 662 662 662
R2 0.148 0.035 0.093 0.069
Spending and contributions variables are expressed in thousands of dollars
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual level
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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PACs that made contributions to the Representative. The spending and contributions variables
are expressed in thousands of dollars. Politicians who were involved in tight electoral races gen-
erally spent and collected more money than the others. More importantly, the estimations reveal
that the discontinuation of earmarks had a positive and significant effect on campaign spending,
contributions from PACs, and on the number of PACs who made a contribution. These results
suggest that the loss of earmarks induced Representatives to run more expensive campaign on
average. The increase in expenditures was financed with a significant increase in PACs contri-
butions. Moreover, these additional donations were obtained by soliciting a significantly larger
number of PACs.
4.6 Discussion
Once earmarks became unavailable, Representatives who had relied on earmarks started devi-
ating from the leadership legislative agenda more often. They also lost votes in the subsequent
elections, while running more expensive campaigns and collecting more contributions from
PACs. As such, these findings strongly indicate that earmarks were used to maintain voting
discipline within the parties. Representatives were willing to trade their votes against earmarks
because earmarks were a valuable electoral instrument. Thus, the earmark stoppage weakened
party discipline and generated electoral liability. This added pressure induced the affected Rep-
resentatives to turn towards special interests - the PACs - in order to run more expensive cam-
paigns, so that they could mitigate the repercussions of not being able to obtain earmarks for their
districts anymore. The chapter does not investigate the consequences of the increased exposure
to special interests, however the findings suggest that the earmark stoppage spurred favorable
conditions for them to exert influence: while decreasing the ability of the parties’ leadership to
bring politicians into the fold, the discontinuation of earmarks also incentivized the legislators
to seek additional financial support by special interests.
The results on voting behavior appear to be quite robust, however those on elections and
campaign finance have to be considered a bit more cautiously for two reasons. First, the sample
population is de facto a selection of Representatives who might potentially be stronger electoral
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candidates. This is especially true of the Republicans in the sample, who survived a Democratic
victory in the 2008 elections. Since the selection was partly based on electoral performance in
the 2008 elections19, there could be some concerns that the results on the effects of earmarks
on elections and campaign finance are biased. Nevertheless, the sample population still retains
more than two thirds of the seats in the House of Representatives (331 out of 435), and thus
offers a relatively wide variety of profiles. Fixed effects should also attenuate such bias, if there
is any.
Second, earmarks came under stronger scrutiny after the parties’ leadership announced that
they would curtail the distribution of earmarks, and they received mostly negative coverage in
the media. The results clearly show that the Representatives who relied on earmarks suffered
electorally after the stoppage. In this chapter, I claim that the losses in vote shares can be
attributed to the Representatives’ inability to obtain benefits for their districts. These results and
this interpretation are fully consistent with the previous findings of Strattman (2013), who found
that earmarks increased the chances of reelection. Moreover, these results are also consistent
with those on voting behavior. However, I cannot exclude that the debates about earmarks in
2010 may have brought bad publicity to the Representatives who had relied on them before. So,
the eamark stoppage may have affected vote shares in the elections through two channels: the
reduction of benefits flowing to the district for which the Representative can claim direct credit,
and the bad publicity associated with her past earmarking. Given the results on voting behavior
and the existing evidence, this chapter places more emphasis on the first channel, but recognizes
that it may not be the only one.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter exploits the discontinuation of earmarks in 2010 to estimate their effects on con-
gressional voting on legislation, campaign spending and contributions, and electoral outcomes.
The results show that the loss of earmarks made Representatives much less likely to support
19Electoral performance was not the only criterion: the Representatives who died, retired, or just left the House
of Representatives between elections were also excluded from the sample.
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the legislative agenda of the party leaders. They also indicate that, without earmarks, Rep-
resentatives faced stronger electoral challenges, which they tried to address by running more
expensive campaigns and seeking out additional campaign contributions from PACs. The analy-
sis establishes a direct and systematic relation between electoral considerations from individual
politicians and policy-making. It also provides a deeper and somewhat positive apprehension
of the incentives that drive representatives’ behavior. Positive, because political institutions are
generally believed to create very high agency costs. However the results of this chapter show
that powerful incentives can be generated from relatively cheap instruments (with regards to
public spending), like earmarks did before the moratorium.
Earmarks used to be a symbol of corrupt politics. They drew heavy suspicions of wasteful
public spending, allocated at the whims of politicians in power. In this chapter, I shows that
earmarks were actually critical in the legislative process: they were a tool to facilitate agree-
ments and curb the influence of special interests. Thus, while the moratorium may have stopped
a questionable practice with regards to public spending, it appears to have left Congress less
effective for passing legislation and more vulnerable to special interests.
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Table 4.9: The effects of earmarks on the probability to deviate from the leadership on single votes
Deviations from Leadership line Leadership line
(major legislative actions)
(1) (2)
2009-2010 baseline change -0.0402** -0.0470*
(0.0201) (0.0236)
(2009-2010) interacted 0.0130*** 0.0151**
with Earmarks (standardized) (0.00443) (0.00502)
Tight Election Race 0.00487 0.00349
(less than 55% of the votes) (0.0120) (0.0154)
(2009-2010) interacted with 0.0147** 0.0210*
Appropriations Committee member (0.00690) (0.00831)
Tea party member in 2009-2010 -0.00697 -0.00785
(0.0221) (0.0254)
district unemployment 0.000834 0.000303
(0.00778) (0.00891)
district median -0.0262 -0.0234
household income (logged) (0.104) (0.123)
district percentage of 0.00369 0.00493
families below the poverty line (0.00522) (0.00577)
fixed effects (Representatives yes yes
Observations 1054357 443058
R2 0.003 0.004
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the individual and at the bill level
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
86 Earmarks
Figure 4.1: Distribution of earmarks in the House of Representatives, summed over 2007-2009
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Summary
This thesis is a collection of three stories about influence. Each of them tells, in different ways,
how individuals and organizations can be swayed by external agents and what consequences
such influence begets. The second and third chapters of this book are theoretical and study,
in different settings, how agents with private verifiable information can persuade a decision-
maker. The fourth chapter is empirical and examines a somewhat more elementary instrument
of influence: quid pro quo, in the US House of Representatives.
Chapter 2, co-authored with Otto Swank, uses theory to analyze a practical case: pharma-
ceutical companies that want to bring a new drug to the market have to convince public agencies
that the drug is effective and safe. How- ever, there is evidence that new drugs are sometimes
approved on the basis of incomplete information. This chapter develops a simple persuasion
game in which a pharmaceutical company communicates with a health agency on two aspects of
a drug: effectiveness and side effects. We show that there exists an equilibrium in which a health
agency may approve a drug even though the pharmaceutical company is known to conceal some
information. The out- comes of this equilibrium appear to be consistent with empirical obser-
vations. We also discuss how an equilibrium with full information revelation requires the health
agency to take a sceptical attitude towards all uncertain aspects of a drug.
Chapter 3 attempts to explain how organizations make decisions when they are faced with
different levels of uncertainty. In this chapter, I model a persuasion game with three players: a
decision-maker and two information providers. As in the previous chapter, the decision-maker
is uninformed about the consequences of her decision, and relies on the information provided
by interested parties. In this one however, I assume that the different aspects of the decision
are heterogenous, so that the decision-maker faces an asymmetric uncertainty. The information
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providers act as advocates and communicate on distinct aspects of the decision. I show that
the asymmetric uncertainty introduces a distortionary bias in the equilibrium decision, but that
more uncertainty validates this bias and alleviates its distortionary effects. I then compare the
advocacy setting with two competing information providers to one where only one partisan
information provider collects and sends information on all aspects of the decision. I find that
welfare is higher under the advocacy system when the asymmetry is high, and reach a somwehat
counterintuitive conclusion: competition among information providers that communicate on
heterogenous aspects of the decision is more desirable if the asymmetry between them is high
enough.
Chapter 4 is an empirical study on the uses of earmarks in the US House of Representatives.
For many observers in the US, earmarks - federal funds designated for local projects of US
politicians - epitomize wasteful spending and corrupt politics. Others argue earmarks are critical
for the legislative process because they facilitate agreements among representatives. Despite a
lack of evidence supporting either side, there has been a moratorium on earmarking since 2011.
Ironically, the end of earmarks provides a means to assess their effects on the legislative process.
In this chapter, I exploit the introduction of the moratorium to examine the effects of earmarks
on congressional voting, campaign con- tributions and spending, and electoral outcomes. I show
that legislative support for the party line is tremendously sensitive to the availability of earmarks,
even though earmarks represent less than a tenth of one percent of the federal budget. After ear-
marks were discontinued, Representatives were much less likely to vote alongside the party
leadership. I also show that, without earmarks, Representatives performed worse in ensuing
elections, spent more on campaigning, and collected more money from special interests. The
findings imply that because earmarks made re-election more likely, party leaders could use them
to facilitate agreements on legislation. They also suggest that the discontinuation of earmarks
gave special interests more influence over politicians. I conclude that earmarks are, in fact, better
for the legislative process.
Nederlandse samenvatting (Summary in
Dutch)
Dit proefschrift, bestaande uit drie onderzoek hoofdstukken, heeft als overkoepelend onderw-
erp: invloed. Het tweede en derde hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift zijn theoretisch en bestuderen,
in verschillende instellingen, hoe actoren met verifieerbare prive´ informatie een beleidsmakers
kunnen overtuigen. Het vierde hoofdstuk is een empirische hoofdstuk, waarin blijkt dat parti-
jleiders in het Amerikaanse Huis van Afgevaardigden federale fondsen hebben gebruikt om het
stem gedrag onder de vertegenwoordigers te disciplineren.
Het tweede hoofdstuk van dit proefschrift, in samenwerking met Otto Swank, maakt gebruik
van theorie om een praktische casus te analyseren: Farmaceutische bedrijven moeten overhei-
dsinstanties overtuigen dat een nieuw geneesmiddel effectief en veilig is voordat zij het op de
markt brengen. Er is bewijs dat nieuwe medicijnen soms worden goedgekeurd op basis van on-
volledige informatie. In dit hoofdstuk wordt een simpel overtuigingsmodel ontwikkeld waarin
een farmaceutisch bedrijf communiceert met een zorgautoriteit op twee aspecten van een ge-
neesmiddel: effectiviteit en bijwerkingen. We laten zien dat er een evenwicht bestaat waarin
een zorgautoriteit een geneesmiddel wel zal goedkeuren met de wetenschap dat het farmaceutis-
che bedrijf informatie verbergt. De uitkomsten van dit evenwicht blijken consistent te zijn met
empirische waarnemingen. We laten ook zien hoe in een evenwicht met volledige informatie
verstrekking de zorgautoriteit een sceptische houding moet aannemen tegenover alle onzekere
aspecten van een medicijnen.
Het derde hoofdstuk probeert uit te leggen hoe organisaties beslissingen nemen wanneer
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ze geconfronteerd worden met verschillende niveaus van onzekerheid. In dit hoofdstuk mod-
eleer ik een overtuigingsmodel met drie spelers: een beleidsmaker en twee geinformateerde
actoren. Zoals in het vorige hoofdstuk is de beleidsmaker niet geı¨nformeerd over de gevol-
gen van haar beslissing en berust daardoor op de verstrekte informatie van de belanghebbenden
geı¨nformeerde actoren. In dit model veronderstel ik echter dat de verschillende aspecten van de
beslissing heterogeen zijn, zodat de beleidsmaker met een asymmetrische onzekerheid gecon-
fronteerd wordt. De informatieverstrekkers fungeren als vertegenwoordiger (Dewatripont en
Tirole (1999)) en communiceren over verschillende aspecten van de beslissing. Ik laat zien dat
de asymmetrische onzekerheid een verstorende werking in het evenwichtsbesluit introduceert,
maar dat bij een toename in de onzekerheid deze verstorende werking minder welvaart verlagend
is. Ik vergelijk vervolgens het model met twee concurrerende informatieverstrekkers met een
model waar slechts e´e´n partijdige informatieverstrekker informatie verzamelt en verstuurt over
alle aspecten van de beslissing. Ik vind dat de welvaart hoger is onder het concurrerende systeem
wanneer de asymmetrie hoog is en ik kom tot de counterintuı¨tieve conclusie: De concurrentie
tussen informatieverstrekkers die communiceren over heterogene aspecten van de beslissing is
meer wenselijk als de asymmetrie tussen hen hoog genoeg is.
Het vierde hoofdstuk is een empirisch studie van het gebruik van ”earmarks” in het Amerikaanse
Huis van Afgevaardigden. Voor veel waarnemers in de VS worden ”earmarks” - federale fond-
sen aangewezen voor lokale projecten van Amerikaanse politici - gezien als de belichaming van
geld verspilling en corrupte politiek. Anderen zien het belang van ”earmarks”, doordat zij het
wetgevingsproces tussen vertegenwoordigers vergemakkelijken. Ondanks het gebrek aan be-
wijsmateriaal aan beide zijden is er een opschorting van de ”earmarks” sinds het oordeel van
2011. Ironisch genoeg biedt het einde van de ”earmarks” een manier om te beoordelen wat het
effect is op het wetgevingsproces. In dit artikel exploiteer ik de opschorting om de effecten van
”earmarks” op congress stemmingen, campagne bijdragen en uitgaven en verkiezingsuitkom-
sten te onderzoeken. Ik toon aan dat wetgevende steun voor de partij enorm gevoelig is voor de
beschikbaarheid van ”earmarks”. Dit effect is ondanks het feit dat ”earmarks” slechts een tiende
van een procent deel uitmaken van het federale budget. Na de opschorting van de ”earmarks”,
is de kans kleiner dat vertegenwoordigers de zelfde stem uitbrengen als de partij-leider. Ik laat
ook zien dat zonder earmarks de vertegenwoordigers slechter presteren in de daaropvolgende
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verkiezingen, meer uitgeven aan campagne voering en meer geld ophalen bij lobby groepen.
De bevindingen impliceren dat, omdat de ”earmarks” de kans op herverkiezing vergroten, partij
leiders de ”earmarks” kunnen gebruiken om afspraken over wetgeving te vergemakkelijken. De
resultaten suggereren ook dat lobby groepen meer invloed konden uitoefenen op politici na de
stopzetting van de ”earmarks”. Ik concluderen uit mijn resultaten dat ”earmarks” beter zijn voor
het wetgevingsproces.
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